Unrest Magazine

Unrest Magazine
engaging systems of violence

Issue One, Fall 2010

Table of Contents

Unrest Magazine
engaging systems of violence

Voices

Discourse

Right Hemisphere

About

Unrest is a web-based magazine dedicated to advancing critical conflict theory and expanding the general discourse within the field of peace and conflict studies. Its aim is to explore the structures responsible for human discontent and cultures of violence. It seeks to address the failures of both neo-realist and relativist theories to understand the complexity of contemporary conflicts and to work for solutions free from exploitation and coercion. Unrest is founded on the belief that the seeds of discontent and violence are sown by the structures of domination. Unrest covers a range of subjects including: world politics; the global and political economy; contemporary social and political theory; philosophy, history, and art.

The magazine is an outlet for people interested in approaching these challenges through a critical lens, one that acknowledges the human and environmental costs of conflict. We do not publish rants or have political party affiliations. Unrest is an experimental approach that bridges the gap between zines and academic scholarly journals by creating a multifaceted space for both. Though Unrest advocates critical approaches to analysis and practice, its main aim is to publish intelligent and well-written work that pushes the edge of current discourses. Contributors come from a range of philosophical and ideological backgrounds. Visitors to the magazine have free access to all content. Unrest is edited and managed by graduate students at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia.

Bridging the Theoretical Gap Separating International Development Studies and Conflict Analysis

by **Otto F. von Feigenblatt**

Two growing fields in the social sciences are Conflict Analysis & Resolution and International Development Studies. New programs concentrating on development or conflict are launched every year at universities all over the world. Hundreds of academic journals and trade magazines are devoted to research conducted in the previously mentioned subfields. The recent growth in the two fields has brought many benefits to the study of conflict and development such as the development of more nuanced theories explaining important factors influencing international development and conflict, in addition to a growing number of highly trained scholars and practitioners with in depth training in one of the two subfields.

Nevertheless, there are also costs involved with the increasing differentiation between the two budding subfields. One of the most obvious ones is the sacrifice of breadth for depth. Concentrating on a single subfield allows both scholars and practitioners to narrow in on important previously unexplored phenomena from the point of view of a single subfield. The disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting theory/understanding explains only one aspect of the entire socio-political field. Gone are the days when a scholar could submit a paper dealing with middle theories to one of the dominant journals in the fields of political science and international relations and have any hope of having it accepted for publication. Young scholars are encouraged to "specialize," to concentrate on "manageable issues", and to support obvious conclusions through the tedious measurement and identification of meaningless correlations. Greater understanding of each subfield is important but understanding the connection between the two and their relationship to the world "out there" is even more important.

The result of this trend has been the unnecessary estrangement of two kinds of scholars. One group of scholars has accepted the increasing specialization of the two subfields and concentrated on gathering evidence to support the theories of the great men of the past. Another group has rejected parts or the entirety of the lessons taught by the orthodoxy in favor of the establishment of a plethora of "alternative" subfields. This polarization has been caused in part by the attempted forced assimilation of young scholars into a positivist straight jacket. The painful process has two possible outcomes, either the young scholar is "broken" and becomes a new submissive member of the orthodoxy or the young scholar rebels and flees to a more open subfield. This explains the large proportion of young scholars, originally from narrow subfields, who have joined broad research projects such as area studies, international studies, and cultural studies, inter alia.

Polarization and estrangement are unnecessary and ultimately weaken both international development studies and conflict analysis & resolution. While specialized research should continue it is also important to encourage interdisciplinary theory building so as to make the resulting insights more applicable for practitioners and policymakers working outside of the ivory tower. Conflict and development are two sides of the same coin and neither one can be dealt with appropriately without taking the other one into consideration. It is indicative of the state of the art in the two disciplines that the most active scholars attempting to bridge the theoretical gap identify themselves as members of one of the many "alternative" subfields. Alternative development includes aspects of conflict at the micro-level while alternative security studies includes socio-economic development and even cultural conflict as part of its purview.

The previous assertions about polarization appear to be contradicted by the prominent roles of famous scholars such as Amartya Sen and Johann Galtung in the effort to bridge the gap between the two subfields. Nevertheless they are the exception that proves the rule. Their stature insulates them from the criticism of the cynical masses of the orthodoxy and following their steps can be easily discouraged by asking the young scholar "Are you Amartya Sen?" or "Do you have two hundred publications in peer reviewed

> Polarization and estrangement are unnecessary and ultimately weaken both international development studies and conflict analysis & resolution.

journals and a full professorship?". Thus the young scholar is convinced that unless you are incredibly old and wildly famous you cannot do anything else other than find a correlation that supports one application of an obscure theory. The sad part is that the young scholar will inevitably age, will publish many papers, but most likely will never become as wildly famous and respected as one of the "exceptions". During the process the scholar will forget his or her youthful eagerness to deal with the big issues, and to tackle both conflict and development. This will possibly lead to increased cynicism and the once open minded young scholar will become the next middle aged member of the orthodoxy attempting to "break" the next generation. Closing the minds of those who are supposed to be trained to view the world as a treasure chest of puzzles waiting to be solved will not lead to greater understanding but rather to the slow decay of the sub disciplines into irrelevance. As any young Buddhist novice knows "all is one, and one is all".

Otto F. von Feigenblatt *is an elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland as well as an Academician of the Constantinian Academy of Arts, Letters, and Sciences (Palermo, Italy). He is the author of "Human Security in the Asia Pacific Region: Security Challenges, Regional Integration, and Representative Case Studies", YKING BOOKS, Jaipur, India, 2010. His research has appeared in more than ten peer reviewed academic journals and he is a member of the editorial boards of the Journal of Contemporary Literature and Entelequia. Otto F. von Feigenblatt is currently serving as the editor in chief of the Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences and as one of the chief editors of the Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies. Contact: vonFeigenblatt@hotmail.com*

Three Essays:
Two Empires Falling - But How?
The U.S. Civil Rights Revolution
Conflict Transformation as a Way of Life
By **Johan Galtung**

Two Empires Falling - But How?

Originally published at Transcend.org on 6-14-2010.

Nobody would expect the world US Empire and the regional Israeli empire to be falling gracefully, opting for alternatives. The alternatives, more modest, egalitarian, more 21st century are obvious: a North American region Mexico-USA-Canada, a MEXUSCAN for one, and a Six states solution, Israel with the five neighboring Arab states in a Middle East Community for the other. Seeking security the only way it can be found, through peace, particularly with neighbors, and maybe a strong defensive defense. But such alternatives are not on their agendas. What is on their agenda is beyond the three Obama wars (inherited, yes, but he did not have to accept them) on Terror, on Afghanistan, on Iraq, and the Netanyahu war on the flotilla. There is more to come: extra-judicial killing around the world, with US "special forces" operating secretly in 75 countries--among them Spain, France, Belgium--and Israeli executions of the type we witnessed in that hotel in Dubai, no doubt intended as a warning to others and for that reason well publicized. "General prevention": will it work?

There is the enormous, $180 billion, US nuclear armament, as reported in Washington Post 14 and 26 May: "modernization" of the nuclear weapons complex over the coming decade for $80 billion and $100 billion for "strategic nuclear delivery systems such as bombers and land- an submarine-based ICBMs. But isn't he disarming? Old-fashioned ones, yes.

Then there are the three Israeli submarines off the coast of Iran, from Germany, with nuclear-tipped missiles.
Well coordinated, as we would expect from two countries that came into being the same way, by "divine mandate".

George Bush Sr discovered in 1990 that the best argument for rallying support for the war against Iraq at the time was the possible nuclear threat, not the oil "jugular vein". Junior follow suit, no weapons

were found, neither in 1991, nor in 2003, just like no evidence that 9/11 was executed from Afghanistan. And of course there are no nuclear weapons grade enrichment in Iran. The sanctions are not about that, but about regime change, with "special forces" and green colors for the Iranian opposition (like orange for the failed one in Ukraine) and support to minorities, the usual schemes. In all probability they will not work, but strengthen the government.

Brazil and Turkey made a nuclear deal with Iran along the lines proposed by IAEA and voted against the sanctions. China and Russia voted for the sanctions, probably because they ere even more against a war. For USA-Israel the Brazil-Turkey approach was dangerous because that might prove the nuclear hypothesis to be untrue, so it had to be eliminated--like when the USA withdrew the inspection in Iraq fearing they would disprove their reason for going to war.

The USA is programmed by Manifest Destiny as administered by CIA+, and Israel by Zionism as administered by Mossad+. However, there are two CIA's, one soft and one hard as there are two Zionisms, one soft, onE hard. Soft CIA comes up with the finding that there is no Iran nuclear weapons program, hard CIA does all the above. Soft Zionism argues for peaceful co-existence, hard Zionism denies that. Their project is to deprive Palestinians of their rights, demanding loyalty to the state of Israel, no naqba story, hoping they will leave under that pressure, if not expelling them like into Jordan which Netanyahu considers a part of Palestine, meaning Israel.

The similarity to Nazi German repression of Jews will be rejected in anger arguing the high threshold under which Israel is operating: no gas chambers, similar to those who defend US massive belligerence arguing that no atomic bombs are used ("only" depleted uranium). The tactics are similar: the more one deligitimizes a country through sanctions, and a nation by depriving them of their rights, the easier the next step: war-invasion-occupation, forceful "transfer", expulsion.

This is also why Israel is so afraid of delegiti-

mation, for instance by an objective investigation of the attack on the flotilla. They want to be in command, like BP-Deep Water and Haliburton no doubt would prefer to be in command of any investigation of the oil story and Goldman Sachs of the derivative story. And they are more afraid of nonviolence than of violence and their think tanks view it as attacks on the Israeli stare just like a military attack and to be treated the same way. They live in a bubble of autism.

Even here Germany comes up. Any nonviolent success would be a stab in the heart of the shoa story: there was nothing we could do, only massive foreign intervention would have helped. The significance of the Rosenstrasse nonviolence in the heart of Berlin in the middle of the war is neglected, just like Obama neglected the role of nonviolence in ending both colonialism and the cold war in his Nobel Peace Prize speech, probably the most belligerent ever given (and his contempt for the prize was emphasized by giving the money away to organizations that had nothing to do with peace).

We are in for hard and difficult times. Much wisdom will be needed to navigate the stormy waters ahead of us. So far Turkey and Brazil have charted a course. May others follow.

The U.S. Civil Rights Revolution

Originally published at Transcend.org on 5-24-2010

Greensboro, NC: This is where it happened: the sit-in at the Woolworth lunch-counter 1 February 1960, unleashing a cascade of events leading to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, formally ending segregation based on color in the United States of America. The event got its International Civil Rights Museum 1 February 2010; 50 years (!) later. But then the Civil Rights Act came nearly a century after the Emancipation Proclamation was signed 1 January 1863, making the war anti-secession and anti-slavery. The South fought even more bitterly, England and France gave up the idea of recognizing the Confederacy as slavery was illegal in both, and white workers in the North feared competition from freed slaves so much that enlistment declined and a Conscription Act was passed March 1863. As late as 1850 the Compromise kept the Union united provided federal forces could be used to catch fugitive slaves! Why, oh why, did it take so much time since the first slaves were shipped to Jamestown VA on a Dutch slaver in 1619, the year representative government (for males over 17) was initiated? The museum tells the story with passion, scholarship, and a strong message of the roles of committed individuals and of nonviolence.

Slavery was illegal but suppressing blacks by segregating, discriminating, insidious measures known as "Jim Crow"--keep the Negro in his place--was not illegal before 1964. The South (of the Mason-Dixon line between free and slave states) clung to the rights of states to segregation and discrimination, and the liberties of individuals to believe in racial superiority and prejudice. Charles Darwin delivered a major support with the subtitle to his *Origin of Species*: "The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life". Out of this came the White Citizen Councils for States Rights and Individual Liberties.

A research project 1958-60 on school desegregation in Charlottesville VA brought this author close to that abominable century of deliberate delay. Interviewing white segregationists brought up three major factors in their prejudice: they, the blacks, are angry because of slavery and will take revenge, stab us in the back; they are all communists against our society; they are ugly. Hidden in this was a recipe for individual black advance in white society: take history with a smile, be right wing Republican, be pretty-handsome. At least two out of these three may take you there. It is not pigment. Examples are obvious.

But neither the four million freed slaves, nor the former slave-owners, were prepared for slavery abolition. The Anglo riff-raff living "down the river", down the Appalachians, down the coast, were brutal, violent people, many hardened by English-Scottish-Irish fights. Even a Coca Cola box was segregated, one side for whites (5 cents a bottle), the other for blacks (10 cents a bottle--1950s prices). City wards, restaurants, hotels, buses, trains, waiting rooms, water, beaches, anything: Colored here.

The follow-up to this massive stigmatization of fellow human beings was, of course, like for Jews in Germany, killing. Not by gas, but by lynching. Ku Klux Klan. Not hidden from the public eye but as publicized entertainment. Corpses could be carried into a movie house and the audience, with guns by the Second amendment, was invited to fill it with bullets till it could hardly be carried out. Thousands of lynchings. Over 70 years.

Daily life was a nightmare for blacks traveling, like finding a toilet, a place to overnight. It must have taken some courage for a George Gershwin, commissioned to write an opera on an American theme, to choose the life of former slaves for (the not unproblematic) Porgy and Bess. But progress there was. How?

Imagine a matrix with all cities, mainly in the South, vertically and all forms of segregation horizontally. Could any concrete [place,issue] be a lever for a desegregation cascade?

Topeka, Kansas; the Monroe school, "Brown vs Board of Education", and the Supreme Court May

17 1954 decision to desegregate "with all deliberate speed". A background study for that decision was Professor Otto Klineberg's research on children whose parents moved from the Deep South to New York, measuring their IQ before and after some time in a desegregated and better context: they very quickly converged toward white levels.

But the speed was, indeed, "deliberate". Slow. Rosa Parks accelerated the process with her courageous refusal to get up and give her seat in the black section of a bus to a white man in December 1955 in Montgomery, Alabama. And Martin Luther King Jr saw the potential and--like an Osama bin Laden--verbalized it, in the March on Washington, August 1963: "I have a dream--, for the children of former slaves and of former slave-owners--".

Greensboro, North Carolina; the Woolworth lunch counter, The strategy session of four black students at the North Carolina Agricultural & Technical College 31 January 1960 (room 2128 in the dormitory) made history. D-day was 1 February; victory came June 1963. Then came a terrible backlash to desegregation spreading: the bombing of the 16th street Baptist church in Birmingham, Alabama 13 September: 4 young girls killed, 23 more badly wounded.

The nonviolence of courageous individuals, many white, many Jewish, made up the "We" who "overcame" that major social evil. Today the evil is reproduced in the disproportionate percentage of blacks in the US--world record--prison population, used as slave labor to make prisons profitable. There is work to be done. In the whole world, hopefully without treacherous compromises and a world civil war. Four courageous black students showed the way.

Conflict Transformation as a Way of Life

Originally published at Transcend.org on 6-21-2010 This is the Epilogue of a book just to be printed, *A Theory of Conflict,* TRANSCEND University Press, 2010:

From an essay written in 1968, "Conflict as a Way of Life":

"If you cannot remove conflict, why not adjust your thinking about it? Why not try and see conflict as the salt of life, the big energizer, the tickler, the tantalizer, rather than as a bothersome nuisance, as noise in perfect channel, as disturbing ripples in otherwise quiet waters? In short, why not treat conflict as a form of life, particularly since we all know that it is precisely during the period of our lives when we are exposed to a conflict that really challenges us, and that we finally are able to master, that we feel most

alive". The essay goes on exploring "a science of conflictology" (this book is an effort), "conflictology as a subject in school /emphasizing/ "resolving the underlying incompatibility" (the SABONA project is an effort in that direction); "conflict participation" (1968 was important, today it is almost commonplace), "democratization of conflict management" (could be better, also overcoming the elitism in mediation); "conflict has to be appreciated--if we have the courage and maturity to meet the challenge and enjoy it".

The maturity and challenge ultimately come down to the individual. And the exposure to conflict will generally increase. Groups demand access to individuals, domestic society penetrates groups, global society the domestic society. To withdraw from what happens at the mega, macro and meso levels is hardly possible in today's world, given the means of communication and transportation--and we may only be at the beginning. Withdrawing together with others--in a conflict-free local community, a territorially closed vicinity--will play a role. But so will exposure to the enormous diversity of the human condition, like the life stages we all experience. Culture will open for new values also when basic needs and interests are met. Close also that window? There will still be forces and counter-forces as long as there are humans around. Shutting them out, opting for the hermit style? Not only a-human but anti-human. An inner dialectic, dynamism, detached from an outer dialectic, is only for the very few.

Conflict is our fate. As are micro-organisms, so better learn how to handle them. The exposure to the pursuit of goals blocked by the pursuit of other goals can be overcome if our resistance capacity is sufficient, like an infection can be overcome by the immune system. But, if conflict is (almost) identified with violence then major parts of that resistance capacity is lost in an otherwise laudable effort to reduce violence. What is lost is the challenge to transcend, going beyond, at all four levels, as human growth, social growth, regional, global growth.

Of course we can transcend without conflict. We may have a goal, an end but not the means; in other words, a problem. We may apply our human creativity to it; Einstein, Picasso. But the conflict adds the dynamic of at least two incompatible goal pursuits, as driving forces. Attention, please, here and now. Have as a goal a master's degree and time money and hard work will bring you there. Have as a goal joint study for shared love, and empathy and creativity may be needed.

Thus, we are laboring in our societies to bridge the legitimate goals of growth and distribution, including with Nature. The easy way out is laziness: go for one of these goals only. Such actors exist. But going

for both has led to social capitalism, the Japanese and Chinese models; not perfect, but new and more is on the way. Politics is the art of the impossible; otherwise it is merely technology.

We are also laboring in a world with North-South and West-Islam. The lazy way out, once again, is to go for one horn of these dilemmas. But the other horn does not go way, we are coupled. be it in a world or a domestic order, or disorder. Take it on, no laziness, please.

Using incompatibilities, contradictions, as challenge gives us energy to draw upon. Driving history forward? Depends, it comes with no guarantee, except the daoist promise that new contradictions are lining up. Unspent energy can be hitched on to the contradiction next in line.

The point is to balance between the Scylla of apathy, simply giving in to some either-or, and the Charybdis of fighting the alternative with negative conflict energy. But is that not to demand too much of us poor human beings? Not really, there are ample rewards. Not only getting a degree but together with your love; enjoying the fruits of both growth and distribution; having regions enrich each other, two-way, not one-way only, opening oneself to the wisdom of two, three, many religions. What could be more rewarding once we get out of the either-or trap?

But there is a hitch: it may be hard work. And difficult work. Why should it be easy? Who said that such both-and fruits are served on a platter free of charge? However, it is not necessary to have absorbed critically these pages, or similar books. Rather, let us boil it down to a simple essence, taking "five" from islam and the word "commandment" from christianity.

For conflict transformation as a way of life, on top of conflict as a way of life, consider these five commandments:

No. 1. Try to see a conflict from above: the actors, their goals. their pursuits, their clashes. Including yourself. You may need outside help.

No. 2. Try to be evenhanded. Try to see yourself, or the other side of yourself as clearly as you see the others. Again, you may need help.

No. 3. The legitimacy test: be judgmental about goals and pursuits, ends and means, including your own. What is legitimate--legal, compatible with human rights, with basic human needs--what is not?

No. 4. Look at all those legitimate goals and pursuits and put your joint creativity to work: what are the minimum changes needed for a compelling vision, with maximum accommodation of all legitimate goals?

No. 5. Enact that vision. And if it does not work, back to No. 1. Try again. And again...and again... Perseverance is the key.

If it works, take on the next conflict in line. Start with yourself, your dilemmas, then your disputes with your spouse, your family, at school and work, neighbors; in widening circles. Let your empathic, nonviolent, creative voice be heard socially, globally. And you are part of a world culture of peaceful conflict transformation.

Johan Galtung is is a distinguished Professor of Peace Studies and the founder of TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network.

For Liberation or Exploitation:
Reviving the Human Needs Debate

by **Michael D. English**

The United States' use of conflict resolution practices and theories as part of its nation-building strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq requires us to re-evaluate the aims of the conflict resolution project. It appears from this precarious vantage point that the practice of conflict resolution is moving in a danger-ous and ineffective direction guided only by its desire to reduce violence. Instead of critically investigating the implications of our work during the course of vio-lent conflict, the envelopment of conflict professionals within the military and intelligence industrial systems puts the interests of Western powers and for-profit ven-tures above the needs of indigenous or "host" (if you prefer) populations. Conflict resolution, once a vision-ary movement to recognize the existence of universal shared human needs, finds itself in the uncertain po-sition of being exploited as a supplement to the aims of a failing counterinsurgency strategy. A return to a vi-brant debate about the relevance of human needs to the field is an essential part of rediscovering the human element underlying a liberatory practice of conflict en-gagement. Thus, a primary task of peace and conflict studies in an age defined by globalization and dominated by threat narra-tives should be investigating the ways in which human needs are manipulated to feed the expan-sive thrust of hyper-capitalism.

> It appears from this pre-carious vantage point that the practice of conflict resolution is moving in a dangerous and ineffective direction guided only by its desire to reduce vio-lence.

Herbert Marcuse, one of the leading contributors of the Frankfurt School and New Left, offers an alternate vision to the discussion of human needs upon which much of the field's early work rests. Marcuse, while sharing some similarities with pioneering peace and conflict theorists such as John Burton and Johan Galtung, presents an analysis of needs based in the historic conditions of advanced industrial societies. Marcuse's (1991) groundbreaking work One-Dimensional Man expands a Marxist version of needs theory and focuses on the distinction between "true" and "false" needs; where false needs are a prod-uct of advanced capitalism. The psychosocial dimen-sion of Marcuse's insight reveals how false conscious-ness is embedded within mass consumer culture and as such remains a structural problem left unexamined by the larger field of conflict analysis and resolution. In returning to a debate about human needs the field is given a chance to re-envision the potential for conflict studies to see itself as a practice based on expanding the realm of human freedom and as a shift away from practices based on exploitation and oppression. The challenge Marcuse and other human needs theorists present us with is that we must come to recognize how factors within the capitalist modes of production influ-ence the way we conduct our work. We must overcome tendencies that push us to embrace quick fix, status quo solutions (pacification), instead of searching for creative alternatives to meeting human needs (libera-tion).

An essential element of conflict studies and to Marcuse is the desire to understand how the in-dividual functions within society. How does a person come to un-derstand their environment and how does this understanding determine our response to an-tagonistic conditions? Starting from the basis that advanced in-dustrial society is founded upon the production of commodities, Marcuse (like Marx before him), deduced that the range of human needs was expanded by the sys-tem's ability to generate excess (Fitzgerald, 1985). However, the production of new needs was not without consequence and the category of needs itself is dialectical. True needs are rather straightforward; they are biologically driven and without the satisfaction of them one does not survive. True or vital needs are a prerequisite for the realization of all needs and include food, shelter, and a minimum level of culture. In turn, false needs are imposed by society. The distorted basis of our cur-rent system of labor and production revolves around developing and reproducing needs that are essentially social constructions. Most mass manufactured prod-ucts are produced to satisfy false needs. They are manufactured as part of an unstable system depen-

dent on a continual process of speculation and growth and underpinned by tensions between the labor, administrative, and ownership classes. Marcuse writes:

> The intensity, the satisfaction and even the character of human needs, beyond the biological level, have always been preconditioned...In this sense, human needs are historical needs and, to the extent to which the society demands the repressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to overriding critical standards" (1991, p. 4).

The resultant situation reflects a reality where the generation of false needs by advanced capitalist societies dominates the true needs of the individual. Hence, water is used in the production of gold for export to the global market instead of being used to irrigate farmland to feed the indigenous population (whose labor is being used to mine the gold and turn a profit).

Capitalist development requires a veil of false consciousness and the construction of false needs to reproduce its destructive logic. No matter how much the individual may come to believe false needs as authentic needs they are "products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression" (Marcuse, 1991, p. 5). The individual's desire for a certain level of safety and culture are determined by external sources over which the individual has little control and their quest to fulfill these false needs is often responsible for states of misery, injustice, and alienation.

Marcuse's insights on needs are a necessary supplement to the path breaking work of the late John Burton (though followers of Burton may object to this claim). As with Burton's (1993) theory of basic human needs, there is recognition of needs as a driving factor in most conflicts. Burton's vibrant investigation of the relationship between basic needs and conflict over the course of his life positioned him to understand how unfulfilled needs prevent the resolution of conflict. Burton, along with his collaborator Dennis Sandole (1986), attempted to demonstrate a biological basis of human needs, a position Marcuse's true needs certainly supports. The difference is that Burton never articulated a proper critique of capitalism and largely focused on creating a normative hierarchy of needs that had to be satisfied. Sandole (1993), in particular, asserted the idea that basic human needs was a paradigm shift into what he considered the "Non-Marxist Radical Thought" underlying conflict resolution and was thus an attempt to circumnavigate the impending class conflict of Marxist theory. Burton and Sandole's positivistic tendencies opened their biological/non-historical needs based argument up to attacks from the culture camp (most notably from Avruch and Black, 1987), a charge Marcuse avoids by focusing on the historic conditions responsible for the repressive nature of advanced capitalism, which is absent from the Burtonian view.

One of the tasks of peace and conflict studies in an age of globalization becomes illuminating the false needs buried within the antagonisms of hyper-capitalism. Galtung's (1969) insights on structural violence surely brought this to the forefront, but in the time since his highly influential work was published the human centered aims of the field have been replaced by a normative vision of conflict resolution as one that supports the nation-state system and corporate democracy. It was Marcuse's concern that advanced capitalism lead toward the creation of one-dimensional society, which was both totalitarian in nature and robbed individuals of their creativity. The destruction of the creative impulse within the life world was detrimental to human freedom. Instead of focusing our energies on the complexities of human liberation, we are forced to solve problems produced by the system for its own maintenance. Hence, we spend trillions of dollars in the name of deterrence or terrorism (in both cases, threats that have been blown widely out of proportion), but we cannot seem to find the money to solve the global pandemic that is the AIDS crisis (a largely non-profit making venture). Our notions of security are manipulated to serve the profit margins of an ever-expanding war based economic system and have become the very justification for domination. We are forced to trade both our creativity and freedom for the administration of safety.

The move away from a rigorous study and debate about human needs has left the field of peace and conflict studies open to abuse and misuse. We are a field without a code of ethics or standards of practice. Indeed, the influx of security and defense professionals into the field illustrates the instrumental use of conflict resolution practices when they are not supported by critical examination and a concern for humans over market values. Defense contractors like Northrop Grumman have specialists dedicated to peacebuilding, which raises numerous ethical concerns when combined with U.S. polices determined to portray the use of violence by any group other than the U.S. as evil. Returning to a debate about human needs and examining the dialectic between true and false needs is a step toward reestablishing the foundation of our field based on its radical potential and a concern for the freedom of the individual.   .

Works Cited

Avruch, K., & Black, P. W. (1987). A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolutions A Critique. *Negotiation Journal*, 3(1), 87-96. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.1987.

tb00395.x

Burton, J. W. (1993). Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy. In D. J. D. Sandole & H. V. D. Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice* (pp. 55-64). Manchester University Press ND.

Burton, J. W., & Sandole, D. J. (1986). Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution. *Negotiation Journal*, 2(4), 333-344. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.1986. tb00373.x

Fitzgerald, R. (1985). Human Needs and Politics: The Ideas of Christian Bay and Herbert Marcuse. *Political Psychology*, 6(1), 87-108.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.

Marcuse, H. (1998). Beyond One Dimensional Man. In D. Kellner (Ed.), *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse: Towards a critical theory of society* (Vol. 2, pp. 111-120). London: Routledge.

Marcuse, H. (1991). *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Routledge classics. London: Routledge.

Sandole, D. J. D., & Merwe, H. V. D. (Eds.). (1993). *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Michael D. English *is part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: mdenglish@unrestmag.com mdenglish@unrestmag.com*

Understanding in Conflict:
A Hegelian Approach to Conflict Analysis
by **Ali Ersen Erol**

"In all these events and accidents we see human activity and suffering in the foreground, everywhere something which is part and parcel of ourselves and therefore everywhere our interest takes sides for or against."

-Hegel, Reason in History

Introduction

We all have our own biases within and as the field of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR), which we are taught to recognize, acknowledge and prevent from clouding our impartiality. Despite our work as agents of progress, positive change, and peace it seems we as a field are quite biased towards the status quo – and rightfully so. We also seem to lean away from purely theoretical approaches, ideas that cannot be applied in the field. This, also, is a proper tendency for our field. However, there is one prejudice that is quite hard to agree with. The field of conflict resolution possesses a severe lack of interest toward modern philosophy and toward philosophy in general. This is understandable since philosophy is difficult to apply in practice and is easily dismissed as a luxury we practical people do not have much time for. Precisely because the necessary time is not spent generating new ideas and perspectives for the practical purposes of using philosophy, the field of conflict analysis and resolution misses many opportunities to think more creatively about conflict.

This article aims to do just that, to open a window between the field of CAR and modern philosophy--and a window toward different philosophical approaches in general. The goals are to show that Hegel can be useful for the field of conflict analysis and to underline that different philosophical ideas--from ancient to postmodern--have important perspectives our field can use. Despite that we are living in an age where even pragmatism is considered out of date, as we

> Despite our work as agents of progress, positive change, and peace it seems we as a field are quite biased towards the status quo – and rightfully so. We also seem to lean away from purely theoretical approaches, ideas that cannot be applied in the field.

Rorty (1982) states in the introduction of Consequences of Pragmatism, Hegel would probably be thought of by many as ancient. He has, however, an immense amount of resources which to offer to the field of CAR. Merleau-Ponty (1964) mentions that "all the great philosophical ideas of the past century had their beginnings in Hegel," and he also claims "interpreting Hegel means taking stand on all the philosophical, political and religious problems of our century."

Just like the field of CAR was able to get past the idea of "being neutral," we are also beginning to understand that we are not the number zero in a summative math equation. Our agency -- the very fact that we are studying conflicts, analyzing, and intervening in them -- means that we have a stance and agenda. This should not be confused with a stake in the outcome. The very act of interest in a certain conflict begs the question why that interest arises. Moreover, an intervention does change, or aims to change, the flow of things. Taking that stance is an important act in itself. Taking a stance with a certain depth in a way of thinking would only strengthen one's position, which brings us back to the article at hand. Being an excellent conflict analyst, Hegel offers us a framework with three main merits to approach a conflict: dialectical understanding of conflict, relational freedom, and the Understanding. In the quest to demonstrate Hegel's usefulness, this paper will first explain and then will try to integrate the aforementioned three merits to the field of conflict analysis and resolution.

Importance and Definition of Conflict

Though one can say defining what conflict is as a concept is a tricky and hard thing to do, as we can see from the debates taking place within the field, it appears as though there is some general consensus. We know a conflict when we see one. We can name it

different terms such as a dispute or a misunderstanding, but there is something we can recognize. There is a disruption of the status quo and, as interested persons, we intervene, mediate, resolve, or transform the situation—or at least we try to. Hegel offers a rather unique take on conflict. Although he does not define what conflict is, nor even use the word like we do, a large portion of his work can be interpreted in terms of conflict and its unfolding. In these lines, Hegel talks about a disruption of the norm as a negation of the status quo. Conflict is the negation of the given situation, no matter if it is big, small, violent, non-violent, within the borders of mutual understanding or not; a negation (conflict) is a contradiction:

> "Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." (Hegel, 1969)

This not only enforces the field's basic merit that conflicts are not bad, but good for generating understanding, it goes a step further. Hegel thusly claims contradictions are the only way any given individual or society will move forward and progress (moving forward and progression will be explored further in "Understanding").

At this point, it is important to mention a rather controversial topic, not for Hegel, but for most everyone else who has read Hegel. Although conflicts are the only way to progress any given relationship toward the Understanding, things get quite debatable when we start talking about world history and war. Without getting into a lengthy explanation of Hegel's metaphysics, we can at least say that according to Hegel there are certain people who exceed their time and who progress the Spirit of World History. People who embody the History of the World are according to Hegel not bound by the laws and morality of their time (since they are beyond it) (1956; p. 67). They are justified by the results of their actions, which they might not be necessarily aware of. To use Hegel's favorite example, Napoleon introduced so many reforms to Europe in so many different areas that no one else could have pushed the progression of World History if it was not for Napoleon. That is why, according to Hegel, the millions of deaths in Napoleonic wars were justified. Although it is a very worthy topic of discussion, getting into such complicated matters of ethics is not the aim of this paper and would be gravely counterproductive for the purposes of this article.

Conflict as Dialectic

Treating conflict as the only way to overcome the status quo and achieve a better state of being, a Hegelian framework suggests that conflicts are natural phenomena, a result of the duality of existence. This suggests a dialectical understanding of nature, as well as conflict. But what do we mean by the dialectical nature of the conflict? To answer that question, let us further explore the idea of dialectics, what exactly they are and why they are so central and important in Hegelian philosophy.

A dialectical way of thinking is the basis of Hegelian understanding. Quoting Hegel, Speight (2008) claims that not only is ""the very nature of thinking is dialectic" (pg. 11)...finite things are inherently dialectical." Perhaps the best example that can be provided is found in the preface of the Phenomenology (Hegel, 1977, pg. 2). With the following example Hegel shows that dialectics are not just an unfolding of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but an interlocking system with many layers:

"The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole."

According to the understanding of dialectics in this metaphor, a conflict, though "they negate the given situation" cannot exist if it were not for the conditions in which they happen (Pippin, 2008). In other words, every situation inherently has its own negation, every status quo inherently has its resistance, every couple inherently has their couple problems, and every war inherently opens the door for anti-war movements. If it was not for the inequalities in the U.S. political system, for example, there would not be a civil rights movement. If there was not any conflict, there would not be the field of conflict resolution.

In addition to this big picture sense of dialectical existence of conflicts, we can identify dialectical patterns in conflicts themselves. During a mediation session, we will most likely hear positions and counter-positions, arguments and counter-arguments, narratives and counter-narratives. A party will employ a negation when he or she is confronted with a position or an argument that differs from their own. Two countries at war will have different perspectives on the history of their dispute and those perspectives will most likely try to negate each other.

This means a conflict will unfold in a dialectical pattern. When X contradicts Y, this means these two parties are in a state of conflict. Where Y is the

status quo, X is its negation; where Y is the thesis, X is the antithesis. Their meeting will result in a synthesis, regardless of an intervention. Synthesis means nothing more than the clash of thesis and antithesis. What kind of synthesis it will bring about, however, might depend on the intervention or lack thereof. For example:

1. There might be a synthesis which becomes an intractable conflict with a constant stalemate, just as experienced between Israel and Palestine.
2. There might be a synthesis which becomes an intractable conflict, not with a constant stalemate, but with lack of communication and lack of willingness to engage the conflict, just like there has been between Turkey and Armenia.
3. The synthesis might unfortunately end up being a violent act, such as murder, war, or genocide.

In the three cases above, the newly established synthesis becomes the new status quo. In such cases, the intervener needs to shoulder the role of "contradiction" as he or she tries to negate the conflict situation. The purpose of the clash between the new status quo, "the conflict," and the intervener is to supply a momentum, as aforementioned. The momentum will be towards "the Understanding." Without having to confront the conflict as an established status quo, it would be best to guide the clashing parties to a synthesis that would bring the parties closer to "the Understanding." Such perfect intervention, unfortunately, is rarely the case.

To summarize and list the importance of dialectical thinking in interpreting conflicts:

In a more macro sense, conflict can be understood as a negation of the status quo and peace efforts as a negation of the conflict. The resulting product would be 'the synthesis' or the new status quo which also has a further negation, and this dynamic would keep unfolding.

In a more local sense, conflicts are constructed as dialectical. It is nearly impossible to see a non-dialectical conflict (according to Hegel, everything in the universe is dialectical). There is constant unfolding of narratives-counter narratives and action-reaction between agents.

One consequence that will be mentioned later on in the paper is the impossibility of achieving a resolution. A dialectical system constantly unfolds and nothing ever ends. Conflicts can only be transformed towards "the Understanding.

Relational Freedom

A Hegelian framework of conflict has to do with freedom as much as it has to do with the dialectical nature of conflicts. Why the concept of freedom is important for a Hegelian framework of conflict goes back to the dialectical understanding of conflict. With a swift dialectical move, Hegel concludes that the essence of Spirit is Freedom:

"The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite--Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom." (1956; p. 17)

Hegel goes on to explain that the unrestful relentlessness of the Spirit's consciousness constantly pushes for more Recognition. Defining the Spirit's measure of Recognition as Freedom, Hegel concludes, "the final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of the Spirit, and ipso facto, the reality of that freedom" (1956, p. 19). This means that every conflict in the world happens because there is a lack of Recognition and Freedom in the conflict situation.

This brings us to Hegel's idea that every entity in the world, from humans to states, is related to each other with mutual recognition and freedom. To explain this further, let us contrast Hegel's idea of free will to relational freedom. Hegel does not oppose an understanding of "fully reflexive, free human mindedness" (Pippin, 2008). This means a power to create a world in one's own image, so to speak, or a free will of agency. Although he does not oppose it, such an understanding of free will does not concern Hegel. According to Hegel, the existence of relational freedom is much more prominent, liberating, or limiting than any kind of free will one can ever posses. A "perfect freedom and independence, 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I,'" is the idea of freedom Hegel (1977) sees as most important. This "being with self in another" is a collectively achieved relational state (Pippin, 2008). It is involving oneself, relating oneself to others, being active with others via deeds and practices.

Such an idea of relational freedom focuses on our relationships, which can enable more for us, instead of mainly focusing on the enabling power of individual agency. Precisely because Hegel values relationship over individual agency, the role that the intervener assumes is extremely crucial. In this framework, the intervener creates a liberating relationship expanding the range and the repertoire of the knowledge of discourse and behavior for the conflicting parties.

Ironically, at this point the pragmatic social

constructionist idea regarding the role of established discursive relationships seems to overlap with Hegel's idea of relational freedom. Hegel's idea can be summarized thus: we are free as much as our relationships allow us to be and we can increase this freedom by engaging in more liberating relationships. The social constructionist idea can be summarized as asserting that our knowledge of behavior is constructed within the "context of conversationally developed relationships" and these conversations "are manufactured out of pre-existing linguistic resources...we understand the world in specific linguistic versions" (Shotter, 2002, 4; Edwards and Potter, 1995, 21). Both ideas suggest our relationships provide us with a repertoire on which we can draw from to act. Therefore, the question of free will becomes rather irrelevant. What becomes relevant is the role of the intervener as another relationship providing an empowering an alternative repertoire.

The Understanding

According to Hegel's ontology, world history is a process by which the Mind actualizes self-consciousness. This means history is teleological, that is, it is going toward an end. It also means historical progress is governed by the Mind and, at the end, the Mind will reach to a state in which it can see itself perfectly in what has become the realization of this entire dialectical unfolding as well as of the status that is reached at the end, "being with self in another" (Hegel, 1997; Weiss, 1974). Although this ontological language just keeps on telling its tale, what does the above terminology tell us in terms of conflict analysis?

As was mentioned in the beginning of this essay, one of the consequences of a dialectical mode of thinking is the acceptance of the idea that nothing ever ends but rather evolves in a dialectical unfolding towards a goal. The realization of this dialectical unfolding and its end is called "the Understanding." In a Hegelian framework this is what the intervener strives for: parties' realization of the understanding. In addition to the aforementioned role as a repertoire providing and empowering relationship, an intervener will also aim to create the space for the parties to reach the Understanding. The Understanding, when interpreted from Hegelian ontology to the field of conflict transformation, means a state in which:

Parties realize that conflict is a natural part of existence and their relationship. They might or might not have further conflicts.They can choose to keep their relationship consumed by conflict or they can choose to enhance their relational freedom and most importantly, they can comfortably express their discontents or wills to each other without a need for a third party.

If parties can establish such an acceptance of themselves, of each other and of their relationship, the Understanding will be realized and there will not be, most probably, any further need for an intervener. In terms of the type of this approach, it can be considered transformative. Such a description of conflict transformation is quite accurate for the Hegelian framework, "In contrast to problem-solving styles, relational styles focus less on agreement making and more on opening lines of communication" (Deutsch, Coleman, Marcus, 2006).

Conclusion

This essay did not intend more than to humbly introduce the basics of Hegelian ideas to the field of conflict and offer an opportunity for analysts and practitioners to consider basic merits of dialectics, relational freedom, and the Understanding. If this essay encouraged anyone to consider different philosophical ideas for basis of conflict analysis or to take a further look into Hegel's system of thought, it will be considered a success. Although Hegel proposes somewhat of a utopia when he suggests his perfect understanding of freedom or his idea of a perfect society, and although utopias are generally considered by definition an impossible dream, the burden of trying to establish even something remotely close to that is upon the shoulders of us conflict analysts and practitioners. The dream might go unfulfilled, but we will never know if we don't strive for it.

Works Cited:

Deutsch, Coleman, Marcus (2006). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Jossey-Bass Publishing

Edwards, Potter (1995). "Remembering" Harré ed. *Discursive Psychology in Practice*, London: Sage Publications

Hegel (1956). *Philosophy of History*, New York: Dover Publications Inc.

Hegel (1967). *Philosophy of Right,* New York: Oxford University Press

Hegel (1969). *Science of Logic*, New York: Prometheus Books

Hegel (1977). *Phenomenology of Spirit*, NY: Oxford University Press

Hegel (1997). *Reason in History*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall

Merleau-Ponty (1964). *Sense and Non-Sense*, Northwestern University Press

Pippin (2008). *Hegel's Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press

Shotter (2002). *Conversational Realities*, London: Sage Publications

Speight (2008). *The Philosophy of Hegel*, McGill-Queen's University Press

Weiss (1974). *Hegel, Essential Writings*, Harper & Row Publishers

***Ali E. Erol** is pursuing his PhD at Howard University in the department of Culture and Communication with a specific focus on narrative and discourse. ali.erol@bison.howard.edu*

The Search for an Agreeable Definition of Peace
By **James Filipi**

When our field begins to interact with the outside world, that is, the people in other disciplines and practices other than conflict studies, it runs into a significant number of issues. Primarily these issues revolve around making people understand what it is we are talking about! Even when, or perhaps especially when we talk about words that seem so commonplace. John Burton understood this as he attempted to define for the field "conflict" (a word that many of us use every day). Conflict is a term that is useful to define, primarily from an academic standpoint, as people generally understand what that is. However, a term that is perhaps even more ambiguous in many ways is "peace." "Peace" is something that seems to be a goal for many in the field. And, the connotation amongst the folk is that it is desirable. Furthermore, both in academics as well as folk understanding, "peace" is utopian (where utopian is something that, while perhaps a nice idea, doesn't really exist). Were this to be true, the field would be one of folly and those in it very naïve. Still it is not just a term used by us, but also others: Religions talk of peace, as do militaries and law enforcement agencies. All these fields and practices have a different, yet somehow related understanding of what "peace" is, as well as how "peace" may be achieved.

A quick search online revealed a definition of peace from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:

> 1: a state of tranquility or quiet: as (a) freedom from civil disturbance, (b) a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or custom <a breach of the peace>
> 2: freedom from disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions
> 3: harmony in personal relations
> 4: a state or period of mutual concord between governments b : a pact or agreement to end hostilities between those who have been at war or in a state of enmity
> 5: used interjectionally to ask for silence or calm

or as a greeting or farewell - at peace: in a state of concord or tranquility[i]

While this dictionary definition is by no means exhausting, it does illuminate several points (primarily in how the folk view the term). First, a concept of "peace" exists for all levels of society. Second, outside of the intrapersonal, "peace" is relationship based (whether that is severing relationships, or the creation of non-hostile relationships). Third, "peace" seems to be a destination (or a fragile state of being). Finally, that peace is exists in subjective states relative to the level of society we are talking about; peace is not one thing.

Furthermore, of all these definitions offered up by the dictionary entry, I find greatest trouble with the first one: "a state of tranquility or quiet: as (a) freedom from civil disturbance (b) a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or custom."[ii] This definition is troubling for a number of reasons. First, it supports pacification in favor of status quo (or law and order), and were this desirable, then the Civil Rights movement would have been undesirable and not peaceful. Therefore, in order to maintain peace, we would have to support injustice. Second, which is very much related to the first, it implies that the status quo is de facto peaceful providing there is no unrest and when there is unrest, it is not the fault of status quo, but rather a deviance of society. Therefore, as this definition of peace supports injustices and places the blame for lack of peace on those who are not duly represented in society, it leads me to conclude that this definition is an undesirable state of being, and unacceptable.

As mentioned earlier, these definitions of peace are subject to the level of society in question. However, if one is looking for a good working definition that encompasses systems thought and can therefore be universally understood and sought after, none of these definitions will work. Therefore, a more in depth search of academic publications was conducted. This

> ... peace must not be a destination; it must be as Gandhi said "the way." As "the way," peace is an active state of being and the act of doing something.

search yielded diverse and interesting results.

In many of the journals, peace was not defined as a term. When they did, the definitions were primarily narrow in focus. Examples include:

- Richard Ned Lebow: "the prevention of superpower nuclear war"[iii]

The implication here, is that anything less than total annihilation is peace! This definition is far too narrow, as it does not cover other atrocities, such as genocide, rape, or structural poverty.

- Hilde Ravlo, Nils Peter Gleditsch, Han Dorussen: "That it is a product or byproduct of democracy"[iv]

While democracy appears to be more peaceful for those who live under its rule, there is no evidence to support that democracies actually bring peace.

- Patrick J. McDonald: Peace is promoted by free trade[v] or commerce and capitalism[vi] whereas anything less promotes less than peace.

I find it ridiculous to assert that free trade and commerce, actions which (as currently practiced) depend upon the exploitation of resources and labor, is peaceful. Through the very exploitation it relies upon to create products it generates injustice. If this is peace, then peace seems to be less than desirable.

There were other definitions which yielded a more universal approach to what peace is:

- Ervin Staub: "Conditions that help fulfill these needs in constructive ways and contribute to the development of peaceful relations and fully human lives."[vii]

Essentially, this definition is good, however, it primarily supports particular social orientations to the world that are based on a certain philosophy regarding the nature of humankind and society. Furthermore, it denies the conception that agents of militarism and other forms of security can do peace. While this perspective may not be widely popular by the field, they can claim, with certain legitimacy, to be doing the work of peace based on an alternate philosophy about the world and human nature. Therefore, when dealing with culture that supports the use of military for the ends of peace, this definition still does limited good and may lead to confusion overall.

- Johan Galtung: "Peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds."[viii]
- "Peace is nonviolent and creative conflict

transformation."[ix]

Galtung's first two definitions suffer the same criticism as Staub's.

- -Further parsing peace into two forms: positive and negative- "By positive peace we mean a cooperative system   beyond 'passive peaceful coexistence." [x]
- "Negative Peace is the absence of violence of all kinds"[xi]

Galtung's parsing of peace excludes participation by people who believe that due to fundamental aspects of human nature, there must always be force and "security" to ensure that peace exists; therefore appearing utterly utopian in design. For those that believe he structure must exist to keep humanity in line will never, by these definitions be able to do peace, or achieve peace.

While it may be true that peace must be accomplished without the use of force, coercion and other forms of 'violence;' a discourse on peace will never be successful across philosophical lines, if there can be no agreed upon definition of peace. Or, put simply, if the pacifists all believe the military is incapable of doing peace and the military believes it is essential to ensure peace, neither party is really going to be able to understand each other when they talk of peace. While on the other hand, it may be true that military or some sort of structural force is necessary for peace to exist. Whichever is ultimately true, if all want peace, then there must be some way to talk about it that makes sense to all people. Otherwise, we are merely talking past each other and accomplishing nothing.

History keeps unfolding and conflicts keep transforming, linking to other conflicts creating something different; there is no end. At least, there will be no happy end, as happy endings are always an omission of the final act that creates tragedy. As such, peace must not be a destination; it must be as Gandhi said "the way." As "the way," peace is an active state of being and the act of doing something.

Each philosophical side believes it is working towards peace. They may disagree with how the other side is doing it. They may also disagree as to what that future and that peace will best look like. However, they may be able to be convinced that on each side there are people who legitimately believe they are doing what they must to make peace. Each side may also be able to understand that the other is coming from a very different philosophical background than themselves, and as such will never quite hold the same understanding as the other. However, this still does not solve the issue regarding what peace is.

Given that peace is the desired state of being; and given each side has fundamentally different understandings on the nature of humanity and society that causes them to see this desired state of being manifest differently as a reflection of that core understanding of human nature and society. Furthermore, given that aside from utter annihilation there is never an end, which means there is only means, what we can deduce to be universally true, regardless of the philosophical starting point, that each is doing as they rationally understand they ought to do. Therefore, peace (the active state of desired being) is doing as one understands (s) he ought. Therefore, if one acts in such a way that is in line with how (s)he sees the ultimate state of desired being, that person is doing peace. However, were they to violate that code, they are creating violence.

Ultimately this means that if someone views this field as one composed of non-state actors addressing systems, institutions and structures within society that contribute to injustice in order to bring about peace, then that person must not accept money, or services of the systems, institutions and structures which create injustices.[xii][xiii][xiv]

Notes:

[i] Merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peace

[ii] Merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peace

[iii] I Richard Ned Lebow. Interdisciplinary Research and the Future of Peace and Security Studies . Political Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), pp. 507-525

[iv] Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Han Dorussen. Colonial War and the Democratic Peace. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 520-548

[v] Patrick J. McDonald. Peace through Trade or Free Trade? The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 547-572

[vi] Patrick J. McDonald .The Purse Strings of Peace. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Jul., 2007), pp. 569-582

[vii] Ervin Staub. Notes on Cultures of Violence, Cultures of Caring and Peace, and the Fulfillment of Basic Human Needs. Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 1-21

[viii] Johan Galtung. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization, page 9. Sage Publications, 1996.

[ix] Johan Galtung. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization, page 9. Sage Publications, 1996.

[x] Johan Galtung. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization, page 31. Sage Publications, 1996.

[xi] Johan Galtung. Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization, page 31. Sage Publications, 1996.

James Filipi *is part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: jfilipi@unrestmag.com*

Can State Legitimacy be tied to Funding?
By **Sarah Rose-Jensen**

Pierre Englebert argued in a recent New York Times op-ed (as well as in a previous article with Denis Tull) for the removal of state status or legitimacy from some nations that are failing to adequately perform their functions of state and government, most notably Somalia. Their reasoning is novel, and a bit frightening: most African states were recognized as states during decolonization before they had actually begun to function as independent states, and thus they were given a "gift of sovereignty" by outside actors, rather than develop sovereignty organically, as a contract between a ruler and a people. The authors presume that this means those outside actors also have a right strip this sovereignty away. The illegitimacy of states and governments has been used as an excuse for foreign powers to invade, and the lack of recognizable state structures existing in parts of the world became the basis for colonialism. Questions of what is legitimate secession, versus and illegal attempt of a region to breakaway, have allowed struggles for independence to continue, often violently, for decades because the international community and neighboring countries cannot agree on whether to intervene and on which side. Thus, what Englebert is advocating for is not entirely unprecedented, though he is approaching it quite differently.

> More powerful (again, usually Western) nations should not be permitted to recognize some aspects of a state's legitimacy while denying that the state itself is legitimate or independent.

On some points, this argument is quite sound. Legitimacy of a government or nation is, or should be, derived from contracts between a ruler and a people. Though most international relations focuses on the Weberian or Westphalian notions of states – entities that lave legitimate control over violence and/or territory – little attention is paid to where this "legitimate" force or control comes from. Critical theorists, from the early days of Marx onward, would agree that the legitimacy of the state (if there can be such a thing; many would argue that there is no such thing as a legitimate state) springs from the people being governed, and that states that do not represent or have the support of the people are not legitimate. Engels viewed the state as arising from the society it was governing; alienated from the society, but an inherent product of the society, not something forced on the society from the outside:

"The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it 'the reality of the ethical idea', 'the image and reality of reason', as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state" (Engels, in Marx and Engels, 1973, pp. 177-178).

When leaders fail to uphold their end of the bargain and do not provide stable state structures and governments that meet the needs of the people, then they must be replaced. This view is not a creation of Marx and their contemporaries, of course, but one espouses by many political thinkers, including Rousseau those who wrote the United States Constitution.

However, in Englebert's view, the legitimacy is actually conferred or removed by outside (read: Western) actors, and this stinks of colonialism and paternalism. If the ruler or the people are not strong enough to create or enforce a social contract, then stronger states will do it for them, never mind that the state is weak and fractured in the first place due to colonialism and a lack of self-rule, created by another, stronger state (or conceivably and perversely even the same one). This was one of the arguments for colonial-

ism, and indeed, on a more personal level, for slavery. Members of the "uncivilized" regions could not govern themselves in a way recognized by the west, so the western countries would do it for them. Territory in Africa and other regions was carved up arbitrarily, sometimes deliberately splitting populations to weaken a people's ability to resist colonial control. Of course, we now know that African tribes did control territory, did engage in trade and other agreements, did form alignments with other tribes, and in short, met most of the criteria of statehood, just not necessarily with the forms of parliamentary or royal governments the west was accustomed to. However, years of colonial rule disrupted these vast trade agreements and family networks, leaving African nations foundering to create new, stable structures when the colonial powers left. Some have succeeded admirably, but those countries that are still foundering are not doing so out of any innate inability to govern themselves, but at least in part because of the disruptions of colonialism and the neo-colonialism brought about by resource exploitation. This is the corollary that Englebert misses – the African states created hastily in a wave of decolonization only needed to be created because they had been colonial holdings of European nations that carved up African territory to suit their needs and whims, not the needs of the people living in those territories.

Engelbert argues that as a result of outside donor governments removing legitimacy in the form of foreign aid, citizens will jump on the illegitimacy bandwagon and overthrow failed leaders. In the case of Somalia, he suggests removing funding from government structures and instead focusing it on the would-be breakaway region of Somaliland, which does not have any official measure of independence but which is nevertheless functioning better that the supposedly legitimate central state. It is an interesting way to approach failed or failing states; deal with the structures that are functioning, regardless of whether they are legitimate or legal under international law and opinion. It is also in line with how the US and some other nations deal with Taiwan – to trade and create relations without officially recognizing the state. Taiwan provides a model of a sort of hybrid state status – independent in many ways and engaged in trade and diplomatic relations with other nations, but still not technically independent from China and considered by China to be a province. Much of the international community has adopted a One China policy that recognizes the main land Chinese government as the sole legitimate government, while still recognizing that Taiwan is functioning as an independent nation. These countries are playing a sort of child's game of politics – if they put their hands over their eyes and say they can't see an independent Taiwan, they are still free to engage in trade and other relations with one of the most pros-

perous entities in the region. This allows countries to enjoy the prosperous relationship, without having to support Taiwan's bids for full independence and UN membership, which would anger China and upset that prosperous relationship. It also fails to set a precedent for other prosperous would-be breakaway regions. Rather a convenient bit of ambiguity.

More powerful (again, usually Western) nations should not be permitted to recognize some aspects of a state's legitimacy while denying that the state itself is legitimate or independent. This is true of our relations with Taiwan; the government should stop being hypocritical, recognize that we are involved in trade and other agreements with a sovereign state, and support Taiwan's bid for UN membership. It is also true of Somalia – if the State Department (or the Defense Department or any other department) elects to shift funding and support to Somaliland, to bypass the non-functioning government in Mogadishu, then the US should recognize the independence and sovereignty of Somaliland, regardless of whether it sets a precedent for other reasons seeking independence. Though Englebert likely has the best interests of the people at heart, and his suggestions must spring from frustration at so many years of failure and death in Somalia, creating and enforcing such a precedent in the interest of saving lives in the short term may not be in anyone's interest in the long term, because it reinforces the notion that some people just can not be trusted to govern themselves. This is of course one of the recurring questions of humanitarian intervention – do we have the right or responsibility to intervene even if we are doing lasting harm over time? As one of the most interesting blogs on the subject notes it its title, "good intentions are not enough."

None of the mechanisms for conferring or removing legitimacy discussed above is satisfactory. They all rely on the actions and needs of strong outside nations and structures to create legitimacy, rather than on the inherent right of a people to govern themselves and their territory. The world is full of minority ethnic groups attempting to assert their right to self-rule. Their claims are often denied, not because they lack a historical right to their land or because they do not have valid grievances against recognized governments, but because their independence would upset the status quo, lead to a loss of funds for the recognized government, or set a precedent for another region or people seeking independence. This is certainly the case of the Kurds, the world's largest ethnic minority not in control of their own state. The Kurds have historical claim to the land on which they live, have suffered abuses at the hands of the governments of the countries they live in, and in the case of Iraq at least, control a wealth of resources that could allow them to create a prosperous independent nation.

However, if Iraqi Kurds achieved independence, they would likely take Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds with them, something those governments would find unacceptable. Turkey has said repeatedly that it will not allow the Kurds, represented by the often-violent PKK, to secede. For fear of upsetting an important ally, the United States cannot back Kurdish independence, even though the Kurds could potentially form another key ally in the region. Instead, emphasis is focused on the creation of power sharing; semi-autonomous structures that fail to meet the needs and expectations of either the Kurds or the ethnic Iraqis. This author had the opportunity this summer to work with several Iraqi Kurdish teenagers, and all of them (well educated kids from politically active families) felt that an independent Kurdistan was an assured eventuality, not an impossibility or even a hope. The question is how an independent Kurdistan, or Abkazia, or Somaliland or any other country seeking self rule will come about – whether through a paternal, neo-colonial relationship contingent on adequate performance or through organic self-determination and rule. For the independence of any nation to be legitimate, it needs to come from the people in the territory being considered. If a people in the territory feel the government does not represent them or is not meeting their needs, then they have a right to either replace the ruling government with something that meets the needs of all the people, or to secede and form a new country.

Works Cited

Englebert, P. (2010 June 11). *To Save Africa, Reject its Nations.* New York Times (online).

Englbert, P., Tull, D. (2008). Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Notions about Failed States. *International Security.* 32(4), 106-139.

Engels, F. " The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" in Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1973) *Selected Works, Vol.3.*

Sarah Rose-Jensen *is part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a Masters student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: srosejensen@unrestmag.com*

Mosque Fever, American Intolerance, and the need for Critical Conflict Theory
By **Richard E. Rubenstein**

After months of heated controversy, the debate over plans to build an Islamic cultural center two blocks from New York's City's Ground Zero has finally provoked some commentators to recall the long story of American intolerance. But, having evoked that sad and revealing history, the commentators do not know what to do with it other than use it as a club with which to beat opponents of the "Ground Zero mosque." Does opposition to the proposed center spring from an anti-Islamic groundswell similar to the xenophobic, anti-immigrant movements of earlier eras? Perhaps; there are some important similarities between earlier nativist movements and the current Islamophobia. I want to argue here, however, that without a critical theory of social conflict, historical arguments of this sort do little but furnish one conflicting party or the other with debating points. By presenting the popular tendency to demonize minorities as a fault of national character, they obscure the structural aspects of this behavior and close the road to a deeper understanding of the conflict and the possible ways of resolving it.

Let me explain. Ground Zero, of course, refers to the site of the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on New York's World Trade Center. The proposed cultural center, which includes a mosque, is known as Park51 – formerly, Cordova House, a name recalling the Andalusian city where Christians, Jews, and Muslims long lived in relative harmony during the centuries of Muslim rule. Until quite recently, the dispute over the cultural center proceeded without much reference to America history. Advocates for the project argued that the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom protects the right of Muslims to build a mosque and school anywhere they like, so long as they comply with relevant local laws. Opponents insisted that the structure would insult the memory of the victims of 9/11. Pro-mosque forces replied that innocent Muslims were also killed on 9/11 and that a few al-Qaeda extremists,

> ...the resolution of structurally-generated conflicts requires structural change. In the case of American Muslims confronted by growing popular hostility, I think that this means ending the War on Terrorism in its present form.

not Muslims in general, were responsible for those attacks. Opponents responded that the real issue was the sensitivities of the victims' families, friends, and others whose wounds would be reopened by situating a symbol of Islam so close to Ground Zero. No, countered the proponents, since al-Qaeda does not represent the vast majority of Muslims, the real issue must be the critics' anti-Muslim sentiments.

And so it went, and still goes, with each side effectively talking past the other. Compromise positions have been suggested; for example, President Obama defended the Muslims' legal right to build the Center, while refusing to call their decision wise or morally justified. More interestingly, some conflict specialists have argued that if many Americans are still traumatized by the events of September 11, something should be done to help heal that trauma. For example, if the proposed memorial museum to be constructed at Ground Zero were to be completed, that memorial might provide facilities for the kind of contemplation, analysis, and dialogue that have made the National Holocaust Museum and the Vietnam War Memorial places of healing for many visitors.[i] (On the other hand, if the level of anti-Muslim hostility remains high, the museum itself is likely to become a contested project.) Finally, as the extent of opposition to the "Ground Zero mosque" becomes clear (68% of Americans disapprove, according to an August 2010 CNN/Opinion Research survey)[ii], historical references have now made an appearance in the debate – but without altering its essential character.

The clearest expression of the historical perspective, perhaps, is that penned by Nicholas D. Kristof in The New York Times under the headline, "America's History of Fear." Kristoff's article recalls the history of "waves of intolerance" directed by the American majority against domestic minorities: Irish Catholics, Italians, Germans, Chinese, Japanese, Jews, and others. He recalls the burning down of Catholic convents by

nineteenth century mobs, the anti-Chinese riots and legislation a few decades later, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the long tradition of ant-Semitism, and concludes that:

> All that is part of America's heritage, and typically as each group has assimilated, it has participated in the torment of newer arrivals — as in Father Charles Coughlin's ferociously anti-Semitic radio broadcasts in the 1930s. Today's recrudescence is the lies about President Obama's faith, and the fear-mongering about the proposed Islamic center.

According to Kristof, the starting point for such episodes "isn't hatred but fear: an alarm among patriots that newcomers don't share their values, don't believe in democracy, and may harm innocent Americans." These fears are traditionally exploited by local demagogues, the latest of whom are certain Tea-Partiers and Glenn Beck. But, not to worry. For if fear-driven intolerance is part of the American heritage, so is "a more glorious tradition . . . one of tolerance, amity and religious freedom. Each time, this has ultimately prevailed over the Know Nothing impulse. "[iii]

This invocation of historical precedent performs a useful service by directing attention to the persistent reappearance of "waves of intolerance" in the United States. Moreover, Kristof's emphasis on fear as a generator of anti-minority sentiment seems justified by the historical evidence. His analysis leans heavily on that of scholar John Higham, who famously described American "nativism" as a passionate prejudice directed against newly arrived immigrant groups.[iv] Like Kristof, the older historian attributed nativist sentiments to a combination of popular fears of new, culturally different groups and manipulation of these fears by political and religious demagogues. But Higham also paid some attention to the socio-economic factors influencing such episodes as the "Red Scare" of 1919-21, a movement of panicky hostility directed against immigrant labor leaders preaching socialism or anarchism, and repeated campaigns of racist violence directed against African-Americans. Kristof does not focus on these latter movements, perhaps because they represent more than "waves of intolerance." His approach, while perceptive, remains on the level of what one might call shallow culture, as opposed to the "deep culture" explored by anthropologists like Clifford Geertz.[v] Mass movements of intolerance, as he presents them, reflect a sort of national moodiness. A form of bipolarity, perhaps? No – nothing so serious. As Kristof' sees it, they are products of current fears and suspicions that can be trusted to disappear when newcomers become culturally "assimilated" and earlier worries prove unfounded.

One's initial reaction to this optimism is skeptical, since it does not account for the repetitive nature of waves of intolerance except by reference to America's history of immigration, which is more problematic than Kristof seems to think. Some immigrant groups provoked intense popular hostility, while others did not. Until the September 11 attacks, for example, hostility toward American Muslims was not nearly as intense as that directed against earlier groups like the Irish, Chinese, and Italians. Moreover, the targets of the fiercest prejudice and discrimination, Native Americans, African-Americans, and many Latinos, were not immigrants at all! What we need to know, then, is why waves of intolerance reappear so often in American history, how to read them when they do appear, and how to combat them as a generic phenomenon, not just a temporary seizure of the body politic.

There are pressing reasons to make this inquiry, since the Kristovian faith that America's traditions of tolerance and amity will triumph over her fear-ridden Dark Side is similar to the faith that American traditions of peace and "civilianism" will triumph over the tendency to glorify military force and to accept the normality of continuous war. Indeed, the two faiths are not just similar, they are related, since anti-Islamic sentiment in the U.S. was triggered by a military event and is continuously fed by Washington's War on Terrorism. If the WOT is merely a temporary policy (the cognitive equivalent of a mood), we may expect it to yield before long to more peaceful and enlightened policies which, among other things, should reduce popular hostility towards the Muslim minority. But if the WOT is a largely structurally determined policy, the faith in a return to reason will very likely prove utopian.

What do I mean by "largely structurally determined"? Structure, as the term is used here, refers to relatively stable, frequently institutionalized patterns of social thought, feeling, and behavior. Certain structures that interconnect across the boundaries ordinarily believed to separate relatively autonomous socio-economic, political, cultural, and psychological systems have more power to determine our thoughts and actions than more localized structures do. In part, this influence is related to their relative invisibility. Since each system tends to claim autonomy and to construct the world in its own terms, boundary-crossing structures are initially invisible. Thus, before Marx, there was little understanding of the relationship between capitalism, democracy, and legalism; before Freud, the conscious mind seemed the autonomous master of subconscious drives; before Foucault, few understood how new forms of power and new forms of knowledge shape each other. If "waves of intolerance" are generated and shaped by structural arrangements and forces, we will have to develop a better understanding of these factors in order to avoid

playing the role of King Canute, who tried to calm the tides by commanding the ocean waves to retreat. The tidal progress of Canute's waves, of course, was entirely determined by natural forces, whereas social moods and policies are "largely," not wholly, determined by underlying structural factors. Even if Canute had been Galileo, he could not have tamed the tides, while, for us, truths about social structures may be empowering

Suppose we investigate the structural causes, conditions, and determinants of America's waves of intolerance. What will we find? In a short essay, the most I can do is to suggest a few possible findings and to encourage other scholars to pursue new lines of research.

To begin with, we may find that the phenomena classified under the heading "waves of intolerance" or "mass hysteria" are wrongly classified together and that, in many cases, something more complex is taking place. These metaphors suggest a surge of popular sentiment that quickly rises and just as quickly falls. The image is based upon what many commentators imagine to be the experience of earlier-arrived Americans confronted by immigrant groups like the Irish, Italians, and Jews. Even as to these white European groups, however, racialist stereotyping, discrimination, and violence took far longer to fade than the metaphors suggest.[vi] This is because the antagonism was not the result of simple identity anxiety or the alleged tendency to glorify one's own identity group and disparage others studied by theorists like Henri Tajfel. [vii] The major waves of immigration to the United States were permitted, encouraged, and even subsidized by native businessmen and entrepreneurs responding to America's congenital labor shortage. This had two predictable effects: while providing the newcomers with work, it intensified competition between them and earlier-arrived workers, who often formed labor unions to try to defend existing wage rates against pressure from the cheap labor imported by their employers. The struggle for decent jobs and wages was inter-linked with struggles among workers for political power and cultural influence – a boundary-crossing structural context that intensified conflict all along the line. Indeed, the bitter conflict between "native" workers and immigrants was not mitigated until Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition expanded to include the newer groups, and until it committed itself to a program of structural reforms.

"Waves" of intolerance or hysteria hardly provides an adequate description of this sort of conflict. But the wave metaphor becomes meaningless when one considers the three centuries of racist prejudice, oppression, and violence directed against Native Americans and African-Americans. Not only are these conflicts long-lasting, their duration is related to their revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) nature. That

is, they are not simply about groups competing for relative economic advantage, political power, or social status, but about the nature of the social system and who will control it. Even after the American slave system was overthrown by what Barrington Moore calls "the last capitalist revolution," white supremacy in the South was maintained for another three generations by reducing legally free Blacks to economic and political serfdom.[viii] The Native Americans were almost annihilated in eighteen major military campaigns and a host of minor campaigns that established capitalism, capitalist democracy, and Christianity as dominant systems on the North American continent. It seems clear that the scale, intensity, and duration of intergroup conflicts increases with the increase in salience of structural issues. Perhaps this is why the animus and discrimination against immigrants who preached socialism or anarchism did not recede wave-style, but continued until they were either deported, jailed, or silenced by some other method.

If we return our attention to the American Muslims now subject to "Islamaphobic" attacks of various sorts, two things now seem clear. First, the issues underlying anti-Muslim sentiments are in many ways unlike those that conditioned anti-immigrant feelings and ideologies at an earlier period of American history. Muslim immigration to the United States has increased markedly over the past three decades, but that community, for the most part, is not in intense competition with earlier-arrived workers for jobs, living space, or cultural influence, and is more prosperous than most other immigrant groups. In one respect, the analogy with earlier immigrants remains relevant, since periods of very heavy immigration, interacting with economic crises and other sources of insecurity, have sometimes generated neurotic doubts among Americans as to the purity and viability of their culture and contributed to what Richard Hofstadter called "the paranoid style in American politics."[ix] The period of greatest Muslim immigration into the United States also saw the largest influx of other immigrants (in particular, Latinos and Asians) since the explosive era of 1880-1920.

But a more important structural issue, at least where Muslims are concerned, intersects and influences this insecurity: the fact that the group shares important cultural characteristics with a foreign enemy. The relevant comparison here is not so much with Irish or Italian immigrants as with the Germans and Japanese. During World War I, German-Americans, at the time the nation's largest ethnic minority, were legally persecuted and socially terrorized – a grim history recounted by John Higham and other scholars. During World War II, more than 100,000 Japanese, including Japanese-American families well established in America, were summarily evicted from their homes

and interned in relocation camps in the West for the duration of the war, as well as being subjected to other punitive measures. These legal and socio-political pressures relaxed at the end of each war, although it took another generation for them to disappear. (In 1988, Congress finally passed a law providing $20,000 in compensation to the Japanese internees of 1941-45.)

Compared with these groups, American Muslims have not yet been seriously mistreated, despite an increase in reported incidents of violence or discrimination against them and the hostility revealed by the "Ground Zero Mosque" controversy. This may be attributable, in part, to the insistence by both the George W. Bush and Barrack Obama administrations that Muslims in general were not responsible for the al-Qaeda attacks and that the "War on Terrorism" was not a war on Islam. But if America's overt or covert wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere are structurally generated, they may last a very long time, blurring the distinction between anti-terrorist and anti-Islamic warfare, and increasing the intensity of anti-Muslim feeling in the U.S. [x] I have argued elsewhere, as have other analysts, that these wars are generated by the desire of U.S. economic and political elites to preserve America's status as the world's sole superpower and to sustain an unstable economic system based on "military Keynesianism."[xi] I have also maintained that American patriotism, mobilized to support the so-called War on Terrorism, "does not reflect so much as create a clash of civilizations."[xii] If so, that is, if the war tends over time to become a war against Islam, the wave metaphor provides little hope or consolation to a minority that finds itself culturally linked to America's permanent enemy.

The punchline of this analysis is this: the resolution of structurally-generated conflicts requires structural change. In the case of American Muslims confronted by growing popular hostility, I think that this means ending the War on Terrorism in its present form. But if ending the WOT means altering the system that generates what permanent war, this defines the task confronting those who wish to resolve this conflict. Not just the war but the war system must be the target of analysis and action. One can, of course, work to convince the American public that U.S. wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are making us less secure, not more, and that there are viable, conflict-resolving alternatives to costly, essentially unwinnable military campaigns. But there is a pressing need for analysis of the ways in which our current system generates war and, in particular, for alternatives to a socioeconomic order dependent upon the prosperity of giant military-industrial enterprises and their financiers. Perhaps the formation of a National Commission on Conversion to a Peacetime Economy is in order. The analysis of war-generating political and cultural structures is also needed. In any case, it seems to me that a creative response to the conflict over the "Ground Zero Mosque" must lead beyond an analysis of "national character" to an exploration of the underlying structural issues.

Notes:

[i] This suggestion was made by several students in a class on Religion and Conflict taught in the fall term, 2010, at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

[ii] See The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/113747-poll-public-strongly-opposes-ground-zero-mosque-

[iii] Kristof in The New York Times, September 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/opinion/05kristof.html?_r=1&scp=8&sq=nicholas kristof ground zero mosque&st=cse. A similar argument is made by R. Scott Appleby and John T.McGreevy in "Catholics, Muslims, and the Mosque," New York Review of Books, 57:14 (September 30, 2010), p. 48

[iv] John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925.

(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1962)

[v] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. (New York: Basic Books, 1977)

[vi] For example, it took the Kennedy family more than one century to rise from the status of despised Irish "Micks" in the 1850s to the family of the president in 1960 – and even then, John F. Kennedy's Irish heritage was a live issue despite his family's great fortune. See Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009).

[vii] See Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Tajfel's theory is often presented as a description of innate human tendencies disassociated from historical-structural development.

[viii] See Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), pp. 111-157

[ix] Richard Hoftstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Hofstadter's essay

focused particularly on the paranoia of the petty bourgeoisie, farmers, and others whose individual effort was threatened by mysterious "forces." I discuss the impact of American cultural insecurity on World War I propaganda in Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War (New York and London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), pp. 99 et seq.

[x] American direct military interventions in the Islamic world now date from 1990, when President George H.W. Bush initiated "Operation Desert Shield," allegedly to protect Saudi Arabia from attack by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces. As Andrew Bacevich and others point out, this represents the longest period of continuous warfare in American history. See Bacevich, Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).

[xi] See Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War, op. cit. See also David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Chalmers Johnson, Blowback, Second Edition: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Holt, 2004).

[xii] Reasons to Kill, p. 105

Richard E. Rubenstein *is a part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: rrubenstein@unrestmag.com rrubenstein@unrestmag.com*

The Peaceworkers' Dilemma
By **Derek Sweetman**

In the summer of 2009 I published a book arguing that conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners needed to work alongside business, both local and multinational, to address contemporary violent conflict. What felt like a innovative approach at the time has rapidly been taken up by organizations and the amount of business-based peacebuilding has been increasing quickly – likely not directly attributable to my work, but longer trends in peace and development work. This can be seen in the work of groups like International Alert, collaborative organizations like UN Global Compact, and the growing literature on conflict-sensitive business practices. In spite of this, I have found myself apprehensive about the very cooperation I was encouraging, in a way that I was not able to fully explain until I spent a semester in a seminar working with Richard E. Rubenstein and joined the Unrest crowd.

My path into the field is neither the traditional undergraduate-Master's-PhD line of the focused student, nor that of the international professional stopping by to round out their education. Instead, like many of the people involved with Unrest, I coupled my particular employment history (let me tell you another time why selling minivans to suburban families is the best preparation for mediation work) and reading – a lot of reading. From this reading and the influence of some good professors, I had already decided that the growing neoliberal consensus about how the world should be structured was insufficient for promoting positive peace, incorporating freedom from physical, structural and cultural violence. And yet, I wrote a thesis and then a book encouraging the expansion of multinational business operations in conflict zones.

While working on the project, I recognized this contradiction and eventually proposed a solution that was simply sufficient to let me finish the project. My idea was that the problem was not one of ethics, but of taxonomy. I divided the range of possible work on conflict along two axes, producing four quadrants. The first axis separates approaches that engage the world now from those that attempt to engage the world of the future. The second separates those approaches that include a normative drive toward the resolution of conflict from those that do not. The result is a simple chart (see page xx).

While my tone was much more formal in the book, the argument basically came down to, "See, what I'm doing here is conflict resolution, which my chart proves has to address the here-and-now. I know there are long-term concerns, but set those aside for another day." I'm not completely repudiating this approach, especially as a useful taxonomy of the field, but as a guide for ethical action, as I said above, it was only "good enough to let me finish the project," not a real solution. I may have produced an interesting academic approach to the problem, but it is one that provides absolutely no guidance for how we should actually act when facing a world full of violence.

> I am unwilling to blindly support the continued development of a system that embeds structural and cultural violence over an expanding territory, but I am also unwilling to blindly follow this belief into inaction or counterproductive efforts in the light of documentable human suffering.

As we have been developing Unrest, we have talked about the kinds of questions that should be being asked. I feel that one of the most fundamental is this one – one I cannot answer to my own satisfaction. Recognizing that we need resources, exposure, and support to effectively affect change, and recognizing that the institutions able to provide those resources, exposure, and support are the same ones compromised by the critical perspective I find so persuasive, when and how can we ethically intervene? This may sound more like a classroom exercise than a practical consideration, but in the world people are dying. And for me, this is what makes the question both relevant and difficult to answer. I am unwilling to blindly support the continued develop-

Figure 1: Examples of the regions of conflict and peace literature

	Normative bias toward resolving/reducing conflict	No normative bias
Present-focused	Conflict resolution ADR Peacekeeping	Conflict Journalism History Sociobiology Documentary Efforts
Future-focused	Peace studies Revolutionary Ideologies	Defense Forecasting Risk Assessment Actuarial Analysis

Source: Sweetman, Derek. 2009. *Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Contributions from the Private Sector to Address Violent Conflict.* New York: Routledge. p16

ment of a system that embeds structural and cultural violence over an expanding territory, but I am also unwilling to blindly follow this belief into inaction or counterproductive efforts in the light of documentable human suffering.

I have started thinking of this problem as "The Peaceworker's Dilemma":

Collaboration with institutions that promote structural and cultural violence can help stop direct violence, while avoiding such institutions or working against them could in the longer term improve conditions of structural or cultural violence, but would either result in an increase in suffering and direct violence in the short term or, at best, maintain its current levels.

I would love to say that the dilemma can be resolved through interactions between conflict resolution practitioners and the institutions of structural violence, that what we do and believe will just rub off on those around us and over time the situation will improve, but I do not think that history supports this conclusion. On the small scale, many practitioners can tell stories of parties who are transformed by their exposure to mediation or other collaborative forms, but even this is more likely to affect how such parties approach dispute resolution in the future than their participation in structures of violence. On a international scale, we have seen both an increase in the awareness and use of conflict resolution techniques coupled with growing inequality and other forms of structural oppression.

It is not simply enough to return to discussions of conflict transformation and peacebuilding that claim to strive for fundamental changes in relationships and structures. The situations in which these true transformations are possible are those that avoid the Peaceworkers' Dilemma entirely. Is these cases,

the dilemma is resolved by only focusing on the cases where it is not relevant. This is not a moral option in the face of death and misery. The dilemma arises now, when we are faced with true suffering.

It would be helpful if we could easily weigh the benefits of immediate resolution against the long-term perpetuation of structures of violence, but no easy utilitarian calculation is possible. We cannot have the benefit of hindsight and all large scale conflict resolution efforts operate in a shroud of ignorance about true conditions and true possibilities.

The Peaceworkers' dilemma would not be much of a dilemma if it was not difficult to resolve, however. I expect that each participant in conflict resolution practice and research has already come to a tacit decision on this issue, although it may not be one that could bear much critical reflection.

By joining the field of conflict analysis and resolution I, too, have tacitly privileged the prevention of the immediate loss of live over the possibility of long-term reform or revolution. I did not do so with a conscious decision, but in the end I have settled on a personal ethics that is close to that presented by Johan Galtung in his essay Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies1:

I would not dispute the right of everybody to act out of compassion, according to their best knowledge, to reduce suffering and enhance life. But human beings are imperfect, and so is our compassion, and so is our knowledge. This principle of human fallibility should, in my view, lead us to draw one consequence: act so that the consequences of your action are reversible. Prefer the action that can be undone. Proceed carefully, you may be wrong. [1]

Death is the ultimate unreversible outcome, so I feel justified in collaborating with institutions that

may extend structural violence. But in the end, is this just another rationalization, like the original taxonomy above? Quite possibly.

Ultimately, I do not think there could be a single, categorical ethical guideline that resolves the Peaceworkers' Dilemma. Our field is made up of layers of gray and few, if any, decisions we make in practice can be stated in black and white terms. Additionally, it is constituted from a very diverse group of researchers and practitioners, both culturally and ideologically. What we must do, as our field continues to develop, is to look for ways to bridge the personal and the structural so that

Note:

1 Galtung, Johan. 1996. Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies. International Journal of Peace Studies 1(1). http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol1_1/Galtung.htm

Derek Sweetman *is part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: dsweetman@unrestmag.com dsweetman@unrestmag.com*

Peace and Conflict Studies in Barcelona, Spain
By **Roberto Luna Salvador**

Conflict is like air; almost nothing escapes its touch.

Peace and conflict studies, like most things in life, evolve. If we can agree that conflicts are inherent to human beings, that they are a universal, natural, and timeless phenomenon, then we could agree we have experienced changes in the ways of solving and transforming them, and with this idea, we could also agree that conflict resolution systems evolved too. This evolution is very old, and probably very slow when compared to our history as a human group.

In this last decade in Europe, we have witnessed the birth of many university programs, which shows the acceptance and interest that Conflictology has sparked. It has become the subject of much attention, especially when Martti Ahtisaari received the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize "... for his important efforts, on several continents and over 3 decades, solving international conflicts," thereby acknowledging not only the work of a person engaged in conflict resolution and transformation, but all those who work daily to promote a true culture of peace, and, of course, the profession. Professors like Johan Galtung, Tom Woodhouse, or Eduard Vinyamata are clear examples of this development not only in Europe but around the world.

More than 10 years ago in Barcelona, Spain, the UOC (Universitat Oberta of Catalunya), through Dr. Eduard Vinyamata, started to develop and offer Conflict Resolution studies. The program experienced a rapid and orderly growth because of the high demand for conflict related knowledge and skills, not only by civil society and professionals, but also by institutions and organizations of all kinds, thus providing a view of Conflictology as a whole, defining it and rearranging and bringing together content for scientific, academic, and practical consistency, with a common and shared ground through the practical results of its application. From the very first conflict (with one's self) to the biggest ones, replies from the field of conflict resolution become more and more accepted and sought, bringing the theory and practice to a model adapted to each discipline. These years of continuous development have promoted specialization and therefore research, not

only from the university but also from the very sources of conflict. Several thousand students have obtained postgraduate or Master degrees from the UOC. The diversity represented in their profiles is crucial to understanding the impact of conflict studies. Most of them have prior university education, practical experience, and are now working on different projects and with organizations in conflict areas on all continents.

Currently, Conflictology studies offers training in armed conflicts, education, family, social and political, crisis management, interpersonal, environmental, intractable, military, police, etc., which has involved and involve many people from many different sectors and countries, including universities, organizations, institutions and research centers.

One of the latest results of these efforts has come to the conclusion of the first Master in Conflictology Degree. It is in English and has professors from universities in the United States, England, Australia, Singapore, Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, Ecuador, and Argentina, as well as from the Spanish universities: Jaume I, Ramon Llull, Granada, Santiago de Compostela, Basque Country and, obviously the UOC. Practitioners and academics from prestigious universities and peace research institutes in different countries around the world get together in this virtual course that makes it possible for anyone, no matter where they live, to access this international Masters course and prepare for professional practice. This program trains students in all applications of conflictology (family, trade, social, political, international, armed conflicts), facilitates internships, and assists in the preparation of research programs and the development of their own professional projects, giving students access to the largest network of people working for the promotion of peace.

In parallel, the Journal of Conflictology was launched by Editor-Eduard Vinyamata and Editorial Manager-Nicole Jenne with a multidisciplinary and multinational editorial team including: Sara Cobb of George Mason University, Eric George of the Universitat Jaume I & Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Roberto Luna of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Ian Macduff of the Singapore Management Universi-

ty, John Winslade of California State University San Bernardino & University of Waikato, and Tome Woodhouse of the University of Bradford, among others.

It is an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed, and open access journal focused on conflict resolution. It provides its content for free based on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. Edited at the UOC, in Barcelona, it is divided into the following sections:

- Articles: As an interdisciplinary journal, it invites contributions from a broad range of sources, which address the theories and practice of nonviolence, conflict resolution, and peace building. Submissions may discuss theories of non-violence, theories regarding the development and transformation of conflicts, theories of practice, and descriptions of the experience of practice, as well as the evaluation of practice. Articles can include policy briefings, review articles, comments and interviews. Volume 1 includes among others, an interview with Professor Johan Galtung; "Conflicts in Africa and Afghanistan," by Jack Shaka; and "A Narrative Approach to Working with an Organization in Conflict," by Nicolaj Kure and John Winslade.

- Pioneers: This section presents significant thinkers and pioneers in the field of Conflictology, their work, and impact on the practice of conflict transformation and future studies. Tom Woodhouse writes about a radical peacemaker and pioneer of peace studies, Adam Curle, focusing especially on the development of his ideas on peace and peace studies and the impact these have had on the evolution of the field at the level of theory and of practice.

- Profiles: This section deals with the work and activities of organizations and projects in all disciplines of Conflictology, with the aim to display the diversity of practice and approaches in the field. Each profile answers a fixed set of questions and passes the journal's review process in order to ensure correctness of the information provided and informative quality.

- Agenda: This sections, which consists of publication of announcements regarding conferences, meetings, publications, academic and research programs as well as other relevant events, is free provided that the announcement is related to the field of Conflictology and that the announced product or service does not serve an exclusively commercial purpose. Example: IV International Congress: Conflictology and Peace, Barcelona, September 30th-October 1st 2010. Universities with Conflictology training programs; NGOs and government organiza-

tions involved in peace processes and conflict resolution; research centers looking at peace and conflict; specialist journals in the field; faculty, experts, students, professionals and peace activists are all invited to participate in this fourth conference for living in peace.

This being an opened access journal, contributions are welcomed at any time and the author guidelines are available publicly ensuring a blind peer review.

This overview gives us an idea of joint effort in Europe, and indeed in the world, where universities, research centers, associations, institutions, professionals, etc, converge towards a model of a world without violence, or, saying it in another way, a world where the energy that produces violence leads back to a positive reconstruction and conflict transformation that has never before been promoted as today with the scientific, academic, and practical lines clearly defined.

This set is changing the vision of, perception of, and action to conflicts of all kinds throughout the world, not only in Europe or Spain. Society, governments, businesses, organizations, people, etc., have begun to understand that conflict is an opportunity and that they are living in a dynamic world that tends towards continuous improvement. It is this understanding that leads them to get the benefits that result from good management.

In Europe, and especially in Barcelona, Spain, we share the vision and conviction of "one world, one conflict," passing through it so that the overall objective of peace belongs to everyone, whether you are large (representing organizations, governments, Universities ...) or small (as individuals).

***Roberto Luna Salvador** is a Lecturer of Conflictology at the UOC (Humanitarian Cooperation, Peace and Sustainability Area). Thesis advisor in Masters and Postgraduates, authored content Initiation into Conflictology and Social and Politic Conflicts. Quality Auditor. Forensic Handwriting Expert. Social & Labor European Relations. Work and life experience in armed conflicts, inmigration, abuses, racism, development, Interior and Justice (National Police Station-Spain), Trade Union organizations, Victim Offices, European Projects (European Social Fund), International / Private Consultant. Contact: rlunas@uoc.edu*

Esta Muy Duro
By **Charlene Shovic**

Introduction

"What you really need to ask yourself is, 'Why am I doing this?'"

Angela was looking straight in my eyes, and didn't blink for the next seven long seconds.

Silence.

I didn't have an answer for her.

Who was I - some young, naïve American, coming in to the small town of San Andres with broken Spanish, anxious to hear what it's like to have a husband go to the U.S. for work? What was I going to do with the information she was sharing with me, how it was to finally hear from her brother who had been gone for 34 days after leaving Guatemala to cross by foot the Mexico-Arizona border? Was I just going to write it all up for a grade on my Ethnographic Field School paper? What were my ethical responsibilities as a researcher? As an anthropologist? As someone entrusted with the stories told me?

And yet her eyes were still fixed on mine, and I knew what she was really asking me was why was I doing any of this? Really, why was I here? "To connect," I finally said. "To learn. And to find ways to illuminate our shared humanity. That is why I am here." My response shocked me a bit. Not because of my obvious lack of eloquence in expressing myself in broken Spanish. That I had become accustomed to. Instead, I was shocked because of where that answer came from. It was deeper, and of course, quite idealistic - but it was real.

And so were the stories shared with me.

Migration

Human migration is not a new concept. Societies, communities, families, and individuals have long had reasons to migrate (economic, environmental, socio-cultural, political, etc). For Guatemala, migration has played a substantial role in the lives and history of the Mayan people, who represent half of the country's population (with the other half being Ladino, or of Spanish and mixed descent).

In her book, *In Search of Providence: Transnational Mayan Identities*, Patricia Foxen states, "throughout different historical periods government policy, shrinking land availability, high population growth, violence, and other factors have made migration, in both its permanent and cyclical forms, a 'well established survival strategy for the rural population of Guatemala' (Gellerg 1999: 171, as cited in Foxen 2007: 63). With the recent Civil War (1960-1996) and global economic downturn, "push" factors that drive Guatemalans to other locations have increased even more drastically. There are currently about 1 million Guatemalans in the United States and Canada. Foxen reveals an important element, that "the host society (the US) was instrumental in instigating both "push" and "pull" factors by supporting military regimes that led people to leave devastation at home and by recruiting cheap, unskilled labor from America's 'backyard.'" Recognizing the broader factors influencing emigrants' decisions, she continues, "The United States' complicity in contributing to these migratory flows has not been reflected in the nation's ambiguous immigration policies toward these populations" (Foxen 2007: XVII).

Communidad of San Andres Semetabaj, Solola

With this complicated historical dynamic in mind, it is important to build the mise-en-scène of San Andres Semetabaj, in the Department of Solola, Guatemala. In the urban center there are about 3000

inhabitants, 88.83% Maya Kaqchikel and 10.54% Ladino. The community is nestled in several small valleys above Lago Atitlan, an ancient, freshwater volcanic lake. The valley begins with patches of forest, cut clean beside larger areas of human cultivation of corn and frijoles. The valley continues down as more houses spot the landscape until they coalesce in the core of town framed by the Parque Central, the municipality, the main primary school, and the colonial Catholic Church currently under restoration.

The houses are of two types: cinder block or adobe. Most have been painted with a bright white, pale blue, pale green, peach, and grey. There are three large, red and white cell phone towers dotting the community, sticking out high above the mostly one and several two-story houses.

Many homes are permanently under construction, waiting for more money to be sent from family members working in the US. The air smells of smoke from kitchen fires, tuk-tuk and pick-up truck exhaust, and of recent rain, dust, or fresh mountain air, depending on the time of day.

Most women in town dress in traditional traje (huipil, or intricate blouse, corte, or skirt wrapped from a large piece of fabric, and a faha, or sash, securing the corte in place.) Most men in town wear western clothing, with western logos such as "Polo" and "Nike." Occasionally, the older men wear more traditional dress, but more reliably they wear some sort of hat, whether sombrero or baseball cap.

No one I talked to did not have a family member or know someone who has gone to the U.S.

Why Do People Go?

When asked this question, the overwhelming answer was immediately, "necesidad" (necessary) or "trabajo" (work).

William, age 36, is trained as a teacher of high school students and speaks and teaches Kaqchikel. He went to the U.S. four years ago and returned about 1 year ago. He has a wife, Angela, and son, Diego. "There just is no trabajo here. No work. Nothing to support the family, especially people who have 10 or 12 kids," he says. He said of course the number of children people have is one of the problems. But it's

complicated, he said, and needs to be addressed. He told me about how work is one of the roots of the issue for the community, and the country as a whole. He said there needs to be jobs that pay what the people need in order to live, and opportunity to be creative and "do more." But right now, there is nothing. There hasn't been for quite a while, he said.

I then asked him why he went. He said, "Necesidad." He seemed a bit hesitant to elaborate, but with patient silence, he continued. "I was a teacher at the time, making an okay living but it was still difficult. Angela was also a teacher, and we just had our baby boy." Even with two incomes, he said, it was hard to make ends meet.

Andras, 24, married to a primary school teacher and with two children, 8 and 5, was born and raised in San Andres, as were all his family members. He is close with my host family and I have thus gotten to know him and his family quite well, eating meals together and talking. He currently drives a pick-up truck to and from the landslide caused by the June 1, 2010, Tropical Storm Agatha, making much less than he had before given the drastic decrease in customers who can physically carry their loads, walk over unpredictable trails of mud or rocks, or afford, even, the extra Q1 ($0.12) travel cost to get to the nearby town of Panajachel. We had talked earlier about his dream job - to be a mechanic. He loves to work on trucks, he said, and went to Guatemala City to work in his brother's shop before he married. "It's my passion," he said. "It's so much fun to figure out what's wrong with the truck, get your hands dirty, and fix it."

He approached me one night out of the blue, about a month after this conversation, his five year-old clutching to his jeans.

"Charlene, estoy pensando para ir a los Estados Unidos. Que piensa usted? (I'm thinking about going to the US. What do you think?)" "Porque?" I asked. "No hay trabajo…no hay. No se que yo puedo hacer para mi familia (There's no work…there isn't any. I don't know what I can do for my family)," he answered.

"I'm going with you to los Estados Unidos, too, right, papa? We're going together, me and him!" his daughter chants excitedly, closely examining the empty expression on her father's face.

I found out later that Andras' brother-in-law, in the U.S. for the past 5 years, is preparing to return and wants to buy his pick-up truck back from Andras, currently Andras' form of income.

I spoke with another woman, Juliette, 34, who had gone to the U.S. to join her husband for a year and a half and returned about a year ago to care for her two children, 15 and 8, who she had previously left in the care of her mother. She came back, she says, "because my daughter was going to start having babies and get married if I hadn't come home when I did."

Juliette talks about people going out of necessity, to find work, but she went, she says, "para conocer." She had always heard about the U.S. growing up from Peace Corps volunteers staying with her family. She wanted to know what it was really like, in person, she says. So she went.

Juliette is not alone in her wanting "to know" the U.S. Many people with whom I spoke reacted in such a way, but often after first responding that they or others go out of necessity.

Some monetary background: The general cost to travel to the U.S. without documentation from Guatemala is about Q50,000 or $6,250. Given the reason for going tends to be "because there are no jobs here and to earn money to support the family," it is highly unlikely emigrants have this money in their ownership prior to leaving. It is often borrowed from a private individual, commonly called a "coyote" that lives in the area, with a typical interest of 10%/month, and a guarantee of payment being the home or land of that emigrant's family. Opportunity to borrow from the bank is essentially non-existent, many people said, given the large amount and great monetary risk that would be borne by the bank. Thus, many emigrants spend between 1-3 years solely working to pay back their borrowed money, and those who die or are deported are left with triple the expense resting on the remaining family – the loss of the borrowed money, the forfeiture of whatever was guaranteed in its place, and the sometimes literal loss of that individual to death or emotional turmoil after having "failed" to achieve their goal to make it to and work in the U.S.

What Is It Like For The Remaining Family?

In the following examples, a core theme was expressed by Julietta: "People say they go to help their families, but in reality, families are more often torn apart."

Effects on Parents: I was standing at the front of the truck bed on the way to Panajachel, when I met the glance of the older woman sitting on the ledge beside me (and the other 23 people squished in the back of this 1992 maroon vehicle). She asked me where I was from. "O, si, yo tengo un hijo alla. (Oh, I have a son there.)" She continued, "He is working there, very hard, and has been for the past two years." "How old is he?" I ask. "Twenty years-old." Silence, as she looks past me, staring at an invisible image beyond the mountain vista blurring by. "You miss him, don't you?" I say in a quiet tone. Tears glass over her blue ojos, and suddenly her hand is over her eyes, shielding them. She shivers, then looks up at me. "Si, he is my son. I worry about him all the time. It's very duro, very difficult…to not have my son." She sticks her moist hand out of the truck to knock on its exterior, signaling the driver we have come to her stop. The truck slows. She reaches to embrace me in the two inches of space left in the packed crowd, squeezes her way to the bumper and hops off. I look back just as she turns to walk down the hill, head down.

Effects on Spouses: For the remaining spouses, the experience is quite difficult. Julietta talked about women who spend the U.S. money their husband sends on other men. She continued, "You have to have the force of God, because sometimes it gets really hard not to have him here. You get triste, solita, and this is when people do stupid things."

Geneve, 35 years-old with three children, 13, 10, and 8, has had not seen her husband for 5 years since he left for Houston. He is currently working in construction and the family and him talk on the phone 5 times a week. Geneve cares for the children, makes tortillas and helados to sell, and hosts a US student in her house once a year. While making tortillas one day, she talked about the absence of her husband. "It's very duro. Yes, we talk on the phone, but…" she chokes up, the first time I have seen her express any such vulnerability in our month of conversations. "But…it's just

not the same as seeing him. Having him be here." Obviously there is a substantial impact on the relationship between spouses when separation exists for years on end and the physical and financial risks are great. Although the women's words were expressive, it was in their faces that I saw another layer of the pain.

Effects on Kids: Children are often impacted substantially by the absence of their father. The ways in which this impacts the child certainly is likely to depend on the child, family, and circumstance for leaving, and lasting effects may not be known for years. Several people told me about their being happy their abusive, controlling husbands left and now just send money. Others talked about how very little care and attention remains for the children given the mother is so busy taking care of the entire family on her own.

"My son is angry," Julietta says. She tells of how her 8 year-old son comes home from events at school or after Father's Day watching his uncle play with his cousins, and says, "Yo no tengo papa y todos tienen papa (I don't have a dad, and everyone else has a dad.)" She tells him that it's just different for them and their family. Her son's father tells him over the phone that, "one day I will be with you." And that he is there for his family, not for himself. But her son can't see that, she says. He is angry, sad, and rebellious, and sometimes when his dad calls he will say he is too busy to talk with him, but she knows he's not really busy, her son just doesn't want to talk to his father. She says her son doesn't understand that his father is there to pay for a better life for them, for school, for clothes, to help them. But the kids seem to think he's there and not here so that must mean he doesn't love them, she says. But, she says, "I've seen emigration destroy families" - "mucho perdir amor y respecto (many lose love and respect)."

In another situation, after talking with her 8 year-old son's teacher and receiving his report card, Geneve told me that her son Raul's grades are poor because he is always thinking about his father, misses him, but most of all, needs him.

Raul's sister, Karina, told me that Raul will talk on the phone with his dad, and his dad will say, "I will be home soon, don't worry." And Raul will ask, "Cuando?" "Soon," his dad responds. And the conversation will change, and their father will start talking about "when I'm home…" Again Raul asks, "Si, pero cuando?"

So What Should Be Done About It?

Julietta, the 34 year-old mother of two who had gone to the US and returned, discussed her thoughts on the future. "Our teachers need to have a conscience, and our government leaders need a conscience." That, she says, is where the problem lies – in better and more responsible governance and education of the children of Guatemala.

William discussed his thoughts more in depth as well. "Monterrey, Mexico, por exemplo," he said. Many people from Mexico go to the US for work. But in Monterrey, you won't find anyone who goes, he said. Because there are jobs in that town. It's unique. The government, the municipality, whatever happened there has worked. And the answer is jobs – give people jobs, and the rest falls in to place. If there are no jobs, there is mass emigration in search of jobs: fathers leave and children are effected for their lives, there is more delinquency, more violence, women look for other men, men in the US find other women…it tears the family apart, the community apart, he said.

"We need leaders. Good leaders. Not bad leaders. We already have too many of those." And Angela told me directly how I might help be a part of the solution: "Find a way to do some good when you return with these stories, with these realities, with these conversations, with the personal connection you have made here. Influence the laws. Help people there understand...people here neccesitan ir (need to go)... We are all hermanos (siblings). And yet, like my two brothers, no se si hay derechos alla (I don't know if they have any rights there). Pero todos son humanos (But everyone is human). There is no respect. Even with knowing the difficult reality they will have to face by leaving their homes, their families, and risking their lives and huge amounts of borrowed money, they go anyways. Why? Why would they do that? Because they need to - need to help their children, their people, their land. They go out of necessity. Maybe you can help people in the US know this reality."

It is in these stories, the stories of people who are often left without room for voice in the broader

discourse, that I am interested. It is in these narratives that we feel what it is like to be trapped in a cycle of historical trauma; environmental, social, and political upheaval; and few opportunities for movement within the confines of such a system. All this, and why can I hop on a plane and come to Guatemala, but am looked upon with envy there by a Guatemalan who cannot do the same and visit the US?

It is in these stories, I believe, that lies a power capable of social change.

Anthropology works to better understand the way we experience, interact with, and create our lives. In doing so, the anthropologist provides a space to bear witness, and in the process, observes the expression of our shared humanity. Anthropology, therefore, has a gift, and thus a great responsibility.
But in all our gusto, we must not forget the humans with whom we interact. They are cannot simply be "informants." I therefore challenge all anthropologists to ask themselves what Angela asked me: "Why are you doing what you're doing? And what will you do with it?"

Works Cited:

Foxen, Patricia. (2007). *In Search of Providence: Transnational Mayan Identities*. Nashville: Vaderbilt University Press.

"Cabecera Municipal: Municipo de San Andres Seme-tabaj, Solola, Guatemala (2,011-2,018)." Publication of the Municipality of San Andres, accessed June 23, 2010.

Charlene Shovic is a second-year Master's student in Public Anthropology at American University in Washington, DC. Her interests lie in the potential of storytelling as a means for social change. She is looking to bring the anthropological lens to creative media to illuminate the shared humanity of "the other." Charlene.Shovic@gmail.com

The Idea of Human Security in International Relations

By **Gianfabrizio Ladini**

Abstract

The paper examines the emergence of the idea of human security in world politics. It begins by showing that the traditional meaning of "security" as the safety of the state has been brought about by the historical circumstances of modern age Europe. The sovereign state and the international system have been set forth ever since as the basic features of the global territory's political and legal organization. During and after the Cold War, however, the close and exclusive relation between national security and state sovereignty began to creak. State sovereignty, moreover, came to be challenged by a new form of warfare which appeared in the wake of decolonization, the globalizing markets and, eventually, the demise of the Cold War itself. Intrastate conflicts, the endurance of poverty and diseases as effective barriers to human development, along with the perception of decreased nuclear risks after the bipolar rivalry, promoted a rethinking of the concept of security in the 1990s. The idea of human security goes beyond traditional statist outlooks in that it upholds the rights of individuals to safety and well being instead of the right of the state to sovereignty.

Keywords: Westphalian state system, Cold War, Globalization, Intrastate conflicts, Security/development, Human security Introduction

Security concerns are the backbone of international relations. The large unpredictability stemming from the complex network of actors, interests and powers operating in the global realm, indeed, provide enough reasons for politics to look at safety as a precondition for carrying forward any other activity. The very meaning of security, however, is embroiled in history in that it is always specific fears, threats and institutional arrangements that give the term its concrete features and its policy outcomes. In order to evaluate the positions, theories and debates over security issues, Baldwin (1997) has argued it is appropriate first and foremost to answer two decisive questions: Security for whom? Security for which values? The concept of security, Baldwin goes on, seems indeed to be constituted by "a low probability of damage to acquired values" (p. 13).

This paper outlines the way the notion of security has evolved in international affairs since modern age Europe, with the gradual emergence of the modern state as the basic political and legal unit, along with the organization of the whole global territory along statist and interstate lines. In such a context "security" came to mean the safety of the sovereign state, endowed with formal equality before like-featured members of the international society. The statist concepts of sovereignty and security began to creak with the Cold War, when the security agenda was shaped globally by the bipolar nuclear rivalry. The decolonization, the globalizing markets and, eventually, the end of the Cold War, moreover, marked the appearance of a new form of war. Rather than being fought between states and national armies, most contemporary armed conflicts take place within state boundaries, thereby challenging the traditional meanings of sovereignty. The dramatic death tolls of civilians, the persistence of poverty and diseases badly affecting human development and at times survival and the perception that the nuclear risks had strongly diminished after the Cold War were all factors that promoted a shift in thinking on security as the exclusive safety of the state. The 1990s, with their hopes and returns to reality, thus witnessed the emergence of an idea of security which goes beyond the former statist outlook to be people-centered and not state-centered anymore. After a short historical account, this paper finally outlines the idea of human security more in detail and two international initiatives are closely examined. It will be argued that, though human secu-

rity is still far from constituting a clear cut concept in international political theory and practice, its basic difference with statist ideas of security lies in their respective 'security values': the right of the state to sovereignty in the latter, the rights of individuals to safety and well being in the former. As such human security naturally extends beyond national borders in a world still organized along statist and interstate lines. The paper concludes by pointing out the gap between words and deeds in international relations. It also observes that, should the idea of human security set forth practical policies, it will have to come to terms with state sovereignty. The latter, however, is not a static concept and sovereign states and governments have been increasingly facing justice-related demands and pressures to abide by global standards of domestic and international governance. In this sense, then, the idea of human security lies at the forefront of the uneasy connections between the requirements of the statist political order and the claims of a cosmopolitan justice. The paper concludes by outlining some issues and problems on the way forward for the idea of human security. The notion of a human security index is examined along with the 'responsibility to protect' and the uneasy role of the United Nations.

1. Sovereignty and security since the modern age

The idea of security featuring statist characters has a long tradition. From the regional historical circumstances of modern age Europe, indeed, this idea came to be linked with the political organization of the whole global territory in sovereign states and with the management of their relations through international law and practice.

Although we are quite used to thinking about politics as having something – if not everything – to do with states, this is a rather newborn custom in human history. Its origins stem from the conflicts between European monarchies in the sixteenth century. They gave rise to the steadfast needs of soldiers and money to be used by kings with an ever-growing absolute power. These pressing needs paved the way for a two-fold relation between violence and political power. On an internal, domestic level the king became the only agency entitled to the 'legitimate' use of force over a population living within given boundaries. Such entitlement was indeed the precondition for a functional, efficient and centralized tax, law and bureaucratic system in charge of safeguarding the authority of the king within a territory. On the external, foreign level the king continued to keep the entitlement to legitimate violence, yet this right was shared with other kingdoms whose political-territorial features were generally the same.

The Peace of Westphalia (1648), signed after the bloody Thirty Years War in Europe, formally underlined this historical evolution by legalizing the political concept of sovereignty as follows:

(a) the sovereign state, rather than feudal or ecclesiastical agencies, would be the one and only supreme and legitimate decision-making authority within a territory;
(b) the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in each state's internal affairs were laid down as a consequence of the domestic supremacy, thereby endowing like-featured sovereign states with formal equality in the international system.

The preconditions and implications of Westphalian sovereignty were meant to abide by the notion of 'legitimate' violence as the violence organized and carried out by the state on the domestic level and in its foreign relations. It was the state in sovereign autonomy, in this order of ideas, which could decide how to deal with its public order and whether to wage war against another state (Giardina, Sabbatucci and Vidotto, 1999, Ch. 8; Caccamo, 2001, Ch. 3; Schmitt, 1950, pp. 141-147; Raphael, 1990, pp. 153-174).

It seems clear, all in all, to what extent Westphalian sovereignty and security concerns are intrinsically linked, since the mutual recognition of sovereignty brings about the open possibility to be both victims and perpetrators of acts of war. Security threats and concerns thereby belong to the basic elements of the international order whose core principles Westphalia established and which, although sometimes violated in practice, still hold today as the legal grounds of international relations (Murphy, 1999, pp. 227-229; Ruggie, 1993, p. 151). It is also noteworthy that precisely these shared concerns made the states willing to establish and agree upon some legal means to regulate their relations and even the conduct of their armed confrontations, within and without battlefields (Bull, 1977, Ch. 5-9). The so-called jus ad bellum and jus in bello, that is, did not need anything

more than the shared interests of the states to their own safety and to some kind of predictability in an anarchical and, thus, relatively unpredictable international arena.

The debates, policies and treaties related to security issues came to be rooted in the primacy of the state, along with its formal right to safeguard its sovereignty, integrity and independence. State sovereignty was thereby given a normative value, perhaps the normative value, in international relations and eventually provided the shared principle for the global order to be organized in similar political-territorial units (Schmitt, 1950). Even the national liberation movements, which were struggling for independence from European colonial powers, had to claim a national and sovereign status that was, as such, an European product (Murphy, 1999, p. 229). Their aspirations to self-determination, indeed, needed to achieve international recognition, were they to be successful, and state sovereignty provided anti-colonial campaigns with such a kind of political status.[i]

2. Sovereignty eroded: security during and after the Cold War

It was not before the outbreak and structuring of the Cold War that the traditional notion of sovereignty began to creak. The Cold War's security agenda, indeed, was shaped by the risks of the nuclear rivalry between the US and the USSR, whose relations came to have global effects, since the outcomes of their nuclear strikes would have known no national boundaries. In this sense, although security issues kept on being formally dealt with as national security issues, security policies were conceived and pursued beyond national boundaries and according to the global logic of the bipolar world. Formal sovereignty could still be named national, in other words, but the security of the state was thought of and managed within collective security frameworks whose power-sharing was strongly in favour of Washington and Moscow. The reality on the ground, then, was that both superpowers felt unrestrained whenever they wanted to mold the internal affairs of weaker states in their area of influence, whether their involvement took the direct form of coups and military operations or the indirect form of funding political parties, trade unions or proxy wars.[ii]

The sovereignty/security relation, in sum, eroded the former from above, that is from the global security context, since state sovereignty was, so to speak, embedded in the great game of the Cold War. Other variables, however, were challenging the sovereignty of the state from within, that is from the domestic level. The decolonization process, the globalizing markets and, finally, the end of the Cold War have indeed paved the way for armed conflicts which, rather than being fought between states and national armies, are waged within a state's territory between different armed groups. In such kinds of conflicts state's sovereignty is actually challenged and possibly erased by non-state actors which claim to be fighting along ethnic identity lines for the exclusive control of sub-state territories and resources (Black, 2004; Kaldor, 1999, Colombo, 2006; Halliday, 2001, Ch. 4). Perhaps the most striking character of these new wars is the death toll of civilians. The ratio between military and civilian casualties was 8:1 in the First World War. Although determining the exact numbers of direct and indirect casualties in contemporary wars is a hard task, and it is even harder to distinguish between civilians and combatants, there are nevertheless some figures and estimates, for example, Kaldor (1999) argues for 80% or UNICEF (2004) even for 90% civilian casualties. The civilian population, moreover, often becomes the intended target of military operations given the specific features of the conflicts' political economy. Contemporary warfare peculiarities are indeed crucially shaped by the global context of the world economy, where the marketing of local resources and arms procurement takes place. The end of the Cold War and of the superpowers' rivalry certainly diminished interest in controlling local conflicts. It severed the political and financial involvement of the US, Soviet Union and the former blocs that were previously able to freeze existing conflicts by arming and supporting one of the parties as well as by providing funds to social policies aimed to keep societal unrest under control. Once this external patronage was no longer available, then striving for control of the local economy, population and resources as a fund raising strategy warring parties used to forge flexible links with opportunities provided by current globalizing markets and commercial networks. Warfare, then, became a worthy economic enterprise, with violence against the civilian population being its mode of accumulation in order to acquire the commodities that global markets demand. As an example, Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord, was able to make $400 million per year during the 1992-1996 war (Berdal and Malone, 2000a, p. 5).[iii]

Besides the changing nature of war, Rogers (2000, Ch. 5) argues, there seem to be other non-traditional 'drivers' constituting a new security paradigm on the rise. In many developing coun-

tries, he says, the persistence of widespread poverty alongside the widening of the wealth/poverty divide, the rising expectations of a more knowledgeable population and the vulnerability of ruling elites to paramilitary actions have strengthened latent or actual conflicts, while environmental limits to development have sparked competition over scarce natural resources.

According to the recent findings of the Human Security Report Project, the total number of war-related casualties has been significantly declining in the last twenty years, mostly due to the lower intensity of warfare and to more effective provisions of humanitarian assistance and medical care in conflict-affected areas (HSRP, forthcoming). The report suggests that the international engagement in conflict-ridden zones may provide some reason for optimism. A decrease in numbers, however, does not mean that root causes of conflict or structural hindrances to development have been tackled and solved for good. Quite the contrary indeed, with the world order firmly rooted in the principle of state sovereignty, international agencies are still faced with little means of intervention against wrongdoings and patent acts of violence, thus allowing neglect, as in the case of 1994 genocide in Rwanda; mismanagements, as in Somalia and Bosnia; divisions, as in Kosovo; silence on Chechnya and Tibet, paralysis on Sudan and Darfur. Besides the direct and well-known violence against non-combatant populations, poverty and diseases keep on working as not-less deadly killers in many contexts, even where the territorial integrity and political independence of the state may yet be formally standing. Although they might be far from threats of interstate war, then, local communities often face direct violence and actual threats which affect their safety and prevent their free development. Intrastate conflicts, the striking death toll of civilians carried out by wars, poverty and preventable diseases, the connections between insecurity and lack of development, along with the perceptions that the nuclear risks has been strongly diminished with the demise of the Cold War, have prompted many scholars and policy-makers to look at the traditional statist concept of security as limited and partially outdated. They moved, then, towards the concept of human security.[iv]

3. Human security: ideas and initiatives

All the factors outlined above promoted a rethinking of security as the exclusive safety of the state against other states' attacks. Though not denying the enduring relevance of national security issues, then, many began to discuss a new concept of security which was people-centered and not state-centered anymore. In their accounts the security of the state is not conceived of as an end in itself – the 'security value', in Baldwin's terms – but relatively to the broader objective of ensuring the safety and well being of the people which, in turn, extends beyond national borders. Differently from the traditional idea of national security as the state's right to sovereignty, the primary referent becomes the individuals' right to security. The qualitative shift is, in sum, "from state security to human security" (Ogata, 2002).

The ideas behind it date back to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860s and in what was eventually formalized in the 1940s UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. The expression 'human security', however, is commonly associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which argued for a concept of security going beyond the traditional statist and interstate outlook. Security instead, it was pointed out, needs to be dealt with as a multidimensional concept comprising not just political-military characters but health, environmental and economic challenges to human survival and well being This notwithstanding, however, the outbreak of bloody intrastate conflicts after the demise of the Cold War - in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and East Timor to name but a few - urged decisively on new international thinking on matters of security and sovereignty.[v] The wars in the Balkans, so close to the West, perhaps gave this thinking a kind of sense of urgency too. Some decisive United Nations' documents were issued in the wake of the changing nature of both conflicts and the UN interventions, with their mixed results and often striking failures. An Agenda for Peace (1992), Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995) and the so-called Brahimi Report (2000) pointed out the need for the UN and the international community to adapt to changes and to adopt new strategic concepts and operational approaches. From the '90s, therefore, there has been an increasing interest around non-statist security issues, although the concept of human security itself is far from clear cut and shared definitions.[vi] Notwithstanding all the different perspectives and criticisms of vagueness, the core difference between the traditional concept of national security and

human security seems, once again, very clear: the 'security value' of the former is state sovereignty, while the 'security values' of the latter are the physical safety, freedom and well being of the individuals (Bajpal, 2000, pp. 22-23).

Besides theoretical debates aiming at specifying the concept, together with its consequences in international law and affairs, two policy initiatives are worth examining more in detail: the UN-Japanese and the Canadian ones. They are indeed of special interest for an outline of human security in that they capture the basic difference in the concept's understandings. The former initiative adopts a holistic approach strongly favouring the developmental focus of human security. The latter approach, instead, is much more narrowly focused on conflict and direct violence. As regards the former, Japan provided funds for the constitution and activities of the Commission on Human Security which, in 2003, issued the report Human Security Now. The report specifies the entailments of the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report and the concept of human security it draws is strongly development-focused. The report underlines that more than 800,000 people a year lose their lives to violence and about 2.8 billion suffer from poverty, ill health, illiteracy and maladies. It goes on to argue that conflict and deprivation have many causal interconnections, thereby suggesting the link between security and development. In such an order of ideas human security means protecting "vital freedoms", such as "freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf." In achieving these goals any human security policy has to adopt two general strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection requires the development of norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities and endow the people with shields from dangers. Empowerment enables people to develop their own potential and to take stronger parts in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. The Commission's policy conclusions call for ten areas where human security is to be advanced: (1) protecting people during violent conflicts; (2) protecting people from the proliferation of arms; (3) supporting the security of people on the move (refugees and migrants); (4) establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations; (5) encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor; (6) working to provide minimum living standards everywhere; (7) according higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care; (8) developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights; (9) empowering all people with universal basic education; and (10) clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations.

The UN-Japanese initiative seem to consider human security within a broader development and even cultural policy agenda. The basic difference with the Canadian approach lies in the latter focusing on conflict more narrowly, without adopting the UN-Japanese holistic view. In the 1999 Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World report issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade the analysis of contemporary conflict is quite the same, as much as the recommendation for new approaches to security. The Canadian report, however, is shaped by two concepts of human security and human development which, though mutually reinforcing in that the former arguably provides an enabling environment to the latter, remain nonetheless distinct. The policy implications are defined as follows: (1) ensuring human security can involve the use of coercive means, including sanctions and military force; (2) the human costs of national and international policies, economic sanctions included, must be explicitly assessed and weighted in policy formulation; (3) security policies must be integrated more closely with strategies for promoting human rights, democracy and development within a people-centered foreign policy; (4) due to the complexity of contemporary security challenges, effective interventions involve a diverse range of actors including states, multilateral organizations and civil society groups; (5) effective responses will depend on greater operational coordination, not least between development agencies and security organizations; (6) civil society organizations, as well as the business sector, are potentially key actors in enhancing human security and they should be treated accordingly with an increased engagement (DFAIT, 1999). Human security, according to the Canadians, is enhanced:

> "by reducing people's vulnerability and by preventing the conditions which make them vulnerable in the first place. Assisting people in highly insecure situations, particularly in the midst of violent conflicts, is a central objective of the human security agenda. (…) Building human security (…) requires both short term humanitarian action and longer term strategies for building peace and promoting sustainable development" (pt. VII).

The Canadian recommendations entail strengthening legal norms and their enforceability in areas such as small arms trafficking, child soldier recruitment, protection of internally displaced persons and ensuring the applicability of legal standards to non-state actors. Improving domestic democratic governance is presented as a crucial strategy as well, so is strengthening the capacity of international organizations to deliver on their agreed mandates.

These two approaches, in sum, are different for they focus either on development or on conflict, though both of them underscore the links between safe environments and sustainable development. It is important to add, however, that the two approaches are not at all to play an "either or logic" since conflict and development are mutually connected: actual or potential conflicts hinders development and economic growth, indeed, while poverty and lack of development fuel conflicts (Stewart, 2004). The two approaches, hence, remains apparently distinct yet complementary. They share, more generally, the same 'security value' in their overarching drive towards safeguarding the rights of individuals irrespectively of their nationality. The point at stake is made clear by Ogata, when he stresses that "by focusing on the people who are the very victims of today's security threats you can come closer to identifying their protection needs. Also (…) you can uncover the political, economic and social factors that promote or hinder their security" (2002, p. 3). The challenge, now, is to move from this shift in focus to concrete policy outcomes.

4. Conclusions: human security between words and deeds

This paper has outlined the idea of human security in international relations since the modern age in Europe, when the building up of modern state structures brought about the statist notions of sovereignty and security. These began to creak with the Cold War, at a time when the security agenda was shaped globally by the bipolar nuclear rivalry. A new form of war began to appear in the wake of decolonization, the globalizing markets and, finally, the end of the Cold War itself. Bloody instances of intrastate wars, the dramatic death tolls of civilians in contexts where they were purportedly targeted, the persistence of poverty and diseases as more indirect yet not less deadly killers and barriers to development are all factors that promoted a shift in thinking on security as having the state as its basic value. In this sense, Schirch (2006, pp. 65-67) observes that the idea of human security bridges the concepts of human rights and human needs in a broader peacebuilding framework with the aim of fostering peaceful structures of social interaction. Human security, however, is not just a matter of academic debate, as the UN-Japanese and the Canadian policy initiatives suggest. The operational meaning of the concept is also alive in debates around a human security index, which could be used to develop a global early warning system with the aim of affecting, advising and improving national and international policy-making (Bajpai, 2000, pp. 55-59).

The gap between words and deeds, however, is notably a huge one in international relations, so it remains to be seen how far the idea of human security will go in practice and how much it will come to challenge traditional notions, methods and institutions of sovereignty. With the international society of states still largely in control of world politics, indeed, human security will have to come to terms with state sovereignty anyway. On the other hand, sovereignty itself has increasingly begun to be questioned by substantive claims of justice and by slow yet significant evolutions in human rights law and humanitarian law jurisprudence. In the context of a more than ever interdependent world, then, national governments and administrations face increasing demands to abide by global standards of domestic and international governance. The tension between the requirements of the statist order and the claims of a cosmopolitan justice is likely to remain for a long time to come. [vii] It is not impossible, however, to conceive of a kind of practical coexistence between principles of national sovereignty and global standards of governance, even regarding basic human rights issues. The hope, then, is that the idea of human security will be able to deliver on practical policy outcomes by engaging in the constraints of the historical circumstances in which it has emerged and by enhancing the real opportunities they provide. There remains a number of problems ahead, however, suggesting that a great deal of work is needed for human security to achieve practical relevance in international affairs and to act as a real security policy paradigm alongside the traditional precepts of national security. These problems call for theoretical questions to be clarified but they also bring about substantial issues of international organization and policy making.

A human security index

The idea of a human security index has been previously cited as an example of the operational meaning the concept of human security may turn to have. An integrated and globally accepted index, indeed, would provide policy-makers with an early warning system capable of informing national and international policy-making. However, even though such an idea may have some appeal, Winslow (2004, p. 260) points out that neither analysts nor policy-makers have so far agreed on a shared definition of human security which, in turn, makes it impossible to collect systematic and integrated empirical data. Mack (2002) and the Harvard University's Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, for instance, propose a Human Security Report as a complement to annual reports such as the UN Human Development Report. The suggested indicators include the number of battle-related deaths, incidence of criminal violence and number of refugees. Factors like GDP, political instability, ethnic tensions or social inequalities could also be employed to map systemic causes of conflicts and to assess the likelihood of unleashing violence. Other proposals, such as the one upheld by Global Environmental Change and Human Security at the University of Oslo (www.gechs.org), recommend the adoption of broader definitions and indicators with an emphasis on environmental security. It is also worth adding that the search for objective definitions and measurable indicators should not hide the fact that some aspects are involved in the idea of security whose features are intrinsically subjective and qualitative, for societies, communities and groups are secure if the individuals composing them perceive no substantial threats to their own survival and well being. The diversity of positions in theoretical debates and thinking eventually testifies to both the richness and the complexity of the idea of human security. This notwithstanding, Owen (2004) argues, empirical measuring and practical monitoring are the critical factors to the normative future of human security. At the end of the day, then, the point apparently consist of enhancing the policy and operational relevance of human security without neglecting its broad outlook. In this regard many – Owen (2004) and Winslow (2004) among others – have suggested looking at the concept of human security as a continuum ranging from 'freedom from fear' to 'freedom from want', with armed conflicts and acts of violence as the most immediate threats to human security, alongside the acknowledgment that the protection from violence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human security. Such an approach would pave the way for a broad vision and definition of human security, capable of paying respect to its richness and complexity. At the same time the operational relevance of a human security index would be enhanced through clear cut thresholds of severity in different human security problems, thereby helping set the priorities in national and international policy-making processes.

Human security, state sovereignty and the 'responsibility to protect'

This paper has argued that the idea of human security directly challenges traditional notions of national security as the state's territorial integrity and political independence. It does so by shifting the primary security referent from the state to individuals and by adopting their right to safety and well being, instead of the right of the state to sovereignty, as the basic security value. This shift becomes dramatically apparent when the state is directly or indirectly involved in promoting insecurity within its borders and against its own people. The end of the Cold War has been marked by instances of state forces intentionally persecuting and killing state citizens during ethnic cleansing campaigns (the Balkans, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo and Darfur, and the list is not exhaustive). This bloody recent history, perhaps with the help of an unprecedented media coverage, prompted many to ask which kind of boundaries, if any, the notion of state sovereignty should abide by. Here lie the roots of human security, as we have already argued.

The concept of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) has appeared as a result of the international attention to the issue. In 2000 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was created by the Canadian government and the following year its report The Responsibility to Protect was released which, though not endorsed and legally adopted by national governments, has been giving the ground of an emerging international norm ever since. The basic principles of the R2P are twofold:

"A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect" (ICISS, 2001, p. XI).

According to the R2P, then, state sovereignty does not give rise to any kind of absolute right for governments but, on the contrary, entails a basic duty to protect state citizens; such a responsibility is eventually prominent before sovereignty itself, so that the international community is entitled to take care of it and to protect the citizens of the state whose government cannot meet these obligations. Over the years R2P has been discussed, disputed and specified by both scholars and policymakers. In January 2009 UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon released the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which was openly debated by the UN General Assembly in July 2009. While generally upholding the principles outlined by the ICISS (2001), the UN Secretary General and General Assembly consider four crimes as matters of international concern and responsibility: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. From this point of view, then, it may well be argued that this kind of R2P constitute a specification of the idea of human security whose focus lies on the 'freedom from fear' side of the continuum we have previously mentioned ('freedom from fear-freedom from want').

The R2P, however, remains open to various criticisms, especially concerning the power relations on the ground of international affairs. Should the international community be deemed responsible for Kosovo, for instance, and not for Chechnya or Tibet? Are we sure that the norm of R2P is not another way for powerful countries to implement their own interests which have nothing to do with moral principles? Why, moreover, should the R2P fall short of safeguarding people's economic needs? And what about natural disasters such as the one that struck Burma in 2008? In sum: although it is not the place for a detailed account of the debate around the R2P, it is worth mentioning its existence along with its problems and the concrete steps it has been able to get through in international relations. It is apparently all the more so given that human security in general, and the R2P in particular, call into question substantial issues of international organization and policymaking.

Human security and international organization: the uneasy role of the United Nations

Human security is far from providing widely shared and accepted definitions. We have previously examined two policy initiatives, namely the UN-Japanese and the Canadian ones, which indeed feature significant differences in their focusing either on the development or on the conflict side of human security or, to put it differently, either on the 'freedom from want' or on the 'freedom from fear'. However, with the different theoretical peculiarities still standing in international debates among scholars and policy-makers, the underpinning idea is that there are, or there should be, some matters of international concern which are more important than state sovereignty. There are some norms and principles, that is, which should be informing national and international policymaking independent from the precepts of sovereignty and, eventually, even in opposition to them.

However, who is entitled to determine and declare these global standards and, even more important, who is to legitimately enforce the international rule of law which they are supposed to bring about? These are the main reasons why human security necessarily entails thinking about international organization and policy-making. It naturally brings to the fore the United Nations, both as an international organization and as the international forum where the problems of war, peace, collective security and development are tackled in one way or other. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005, pp. 326-327) argue, indeed:

"the UN remains a hybrid organization, reflecting the coexisting aspects of the international collectivity: At the same time an instrument manipulated by the great powers, a forum for the mutual accommodation of state interests, and a repository of cosmopolitan values."

As such, then, the UN retains its specific reservoir of legitimacy and integrative power in the inter-

national community.

In this regard it is worth citing the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who, addressing the Security Council in 1998, declared that "the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations" (UN, 1998). The UN was indeed given the high mission of saving:

> "succeeding generations from the scourge of war (...) and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and and better standards of life in larger freedom" (UN, 1945, Preamble).

Half a century later the UN – in its so-called Brahimi report – acknowledged that the organization "has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge" and to deliver on its promises (UN, 2000, p. viii). The bloody 1990s, once again, paved the way for a great deal of self-criticism in the UN. A number of high level reports were issued which call for unified strategic doctrines linking conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as conflict management and development policies (see UN 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004 and 2005). Adequate funding and UN civilian and military forces, specifically trained for complex UN-led peace operations, keep on constituting burning issues showing how far words and deeds can remain in international affairs, and how they likely will for a long time to come.

Notwithstanding the well-known words/deeds gap, however, there are some realistic reasons to think that some positive changes are under way. Governments are under increasing public and international scrutiny and there is an increasing demand for basic global standards to be applied internationally, in the cases of Guantanamo and Darfur, for instance. The R2P focusing on the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, represents a specification of a broader human security agenda and a case of widespread agreement. In this regard, moreover, it has been argued that the R2P crucially differs from unilateral humanitarian interventions in that it calls for a wide range of methods of engagement, from diplomacy, capacity building and civilian missions to collective and multilateral military intervention as last resort. It goes without saying that many tools and practices for international collective action are needed which are not currently present, properly funded or effectively employed. The huge amount of self-criticism that the UN has gotten through in the last fifteen years, however, points out not only that the organization has been facing hard and complex challenges. It also signals internal drives for change and adaptation to a new global environment. To name but one example, in 2005 the UN Security Council and General Assembly adopted Resolutions 1645 and 60/180, respectively, establishing the UN Peacebuilding Commission to marshal resources at the disposal of the international community and to advise and propose strategies of post-conflict recovery. With the aim of merging conflict resolution, institution-building and development policies the Commission would work in cooperation with other UN agencies, financial institutions and in partnership with civil society actors (Hufner, 2007; Ladini, 2009, pp. 42-45).

In sum, the idea of human security is new in international affairs and partly revolutionary for international relations, in general, and for the traditional precepts of national security, in particular. The changing global context, however, has apparently given rise to some relevant adaptations and changes on the side of both scholars and international policy-makers. Debates and initiatives around human security and the R2P, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission, seem concrete steps forward to the idea that the safety and well-being of individuals and communities are relevant matters of international concern and lie among the purposes of international collective action.

Notes:

[i] Concerning the relation between security and sovereignty, it is worth mentioning here that the safety of the state did not entail at all the safety of its citizens. A cautious estimate, undertaken by Rummel (1994) for the 1900-1987 period, points at almost 170.000.000 people being intentionally

killed by their own government.

[ii] Millions of pages have been written on the Cold War. See Romano (1995) and Balzani and De Bernardi (2003), Ch. 11-16, for an overview. See also the Cold War International History Project, carried out by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, for interesting insights on the period from different points of view. Accessible from [www.wilsoncenter.org].

[iii] The wars in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Peru, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Aceh (Indonesia), Sudan, Nigeria and Nepal present some common features that make them different from the traditional type of interstate war. See Istituto Geografico DeAgostini (2008) for an overview. See Berdal and Malone (2000) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) for the contemporary civil wars' political economy. Ross (2003) shows that oil, drugs and diamonds are the natural resources most fungible in contemporary conflicts. More in general, see Gobbicchi (ed.) (2004) for analyses on the complex relations between globalisation, conflicts and security. Duffield (2001) deals critically with the relations between global governance and contemporary conflicts.

[iv] It is also worth adding that non-state actors and asymmetrical warfare pose serious challenges to state armies and traditional war-making. They also have prompted new understandings of security in relation to the non-territoriality of threats and the non-state nature of enemies to national security. See Liang and Xiangsui (1999) and Bellinzona (2003).

[v] See Foot (2003) and Hurrell (2003, pp. 31-36) on order concerns and justice claims after the Cold War.

[vi] See Bajpai (2000), Alkire (2003) and Winslow (2004) for the theoretical debate, positions, critics of the idea of human security, as well as for the most relevant policy initiatives. Edson (2001) provides an extended and annotated bibliography on the concept.

[vii] Here it is worth mentioning Caney (2005) as one of the latest and strongest defenders of cosmopolitan principles of justice. His command of debates and references evolving around international relations and global political theory is impressive and the book is recommended for both those who favour cosmopolitan theories of justice and those who are skeptics thereof.

Works Cited

Alkire S. (2003) A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper 2, London: University of Oxford.

Bajpai K. (2000) Human Security: Concept and Measurement, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper 19:OP:1. Available from [kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_19_1.PDF], accessed on 23 September 2007.

Baldwin D. (1997) 'The Concept of Security', Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 12-18.

Ballentine K. and Sherman J. (eds.) (2003) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Balzani R. and De Bernardi A. (2003) Storia del Mondo Contemporaneo [History of the Contemporary World]. Milano: Mondadori.

Bellinzona C. (2003) 'Al Qaeda: is a new multinational company of terrorism?', ISIG Quarterly of International Sociology, XII, ½.

Berdal M. and Malone M. (eds.) (2000) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Black J. (2004) War Since 1945. London: Reaktion Books.

Bull H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York, Palgrave.

Caccamo D. (2001) Lezioni di Storia Moderna [Lectures in Modern History]. Rome: Carocci.

Caney S. (2005) Justice beyond Borders. A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Colombo A. (2006) La Guerra Ineguale: Pace e Violenza al Tramonto della Società Internazionale [Unequal War: Peace and Violence at the Sunset of International Society]. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Commission on Human Security (2003) Outline of Human Security Now, online version available from [www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html], accessed on 30 November 2008.

Demko G. D. and Wood W. B. (eds.) (1999) Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century. Boulder e Cumnor Hill: Westview Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada (1999) Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, online version available from [www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/foreignnp/HumanSecurity], accessed on 28 November 2008.

Duffield M. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars. London/New York: Zed Books.

Edson S. (2001) Human Security: an Extended and Annotated International Bibliography. Centre for History and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Foot R., Gaddis J. L. and Hurrell A. (eds.) (2003) Order and Justice in International Relations. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

Giardina A., Sabbatucci G. and Vidotto V. (1999) Manuale di Storia: L'Età Moderna [Handbook of History: The Modern Age]. Rome: Laterza.

Gobbicchi A. (ed.) (2004) Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security. Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino.

Halliday F. (2001) The World at 2000. New York: Palgrave.

Hufner K. (2007) Reforming the UN: The Case of the Peacebuilding Commission. Global Policy Forum, January 2007. Available from [www.globalpolicy.org], accessed on 17 April 2008.

Human Security Report Project (forthcoming) The Shrinking Costs of War. Online version available from [www.humansecurityreport.info], accessed on 18 March 2010.

Hurrell A. (2003) 'Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?', in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds.) Order and Justice in International Relations, pp. 24-48.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. Available from [www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf], accessed on 07 August 2009.

Istituto Geografico deAgostini (2008) Guerre: I Conflitti e le Aree di Crisi Oggi [Wars: Conflicts and Crisis Areas Today]. Novara: Istituto Geografico De Agostini.

Kaldor M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. London: Polity Press.

Ladini G. (2009) 'Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 21:2, pp. 37-61.

Liang Q. and Xiangsui W. (1999) Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.

Mack A. (2002) Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security Report. Cambridge: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University.

Mertus J. and Helsing J. (eds.) (2006) Human Rights and Conflict. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.

Murphy A. B. (1999) 'International Law and the Sovereign State System: Challenges to the Status Quo', in Demko and Wood (eds.) Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century, pp. 227-245.

Ogata S. (2002) From State Security to Human Security, Ogden Lecture at the Brown University. Available from [www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ ogata_ogden.html], accessed on 12 December 2006.

Owen T. (2004) 'Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security', Human Rights, Human Security and Disarmament, Vol. Three:2004, pp. 15-24, Disarmament Forum. Available from [www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2138.pdf], accessed on 19 September 2009.

Ramsbotham O., Woodhouse T. and Miall H. (2005) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Raphael D. D. (1990) Problems of Political Philosophy. New York: Palgrave.

Rogers P. (2000) Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. London: Pluto Press.

Romano S. (1995) Cinquant'Anni di Storia Mondiale [Fifty Years of World History]. Milan: TEA.

Ross M. L. (2003) 'Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Ch. 3.

Ruggie J. G. (1993) 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization, Vol. 47:1, pp. 139-174.

Rummel R. (1994) Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century. Rutgers: Transaction Publishers.

Schirch L. (2006) 'Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: A Peacebuilding Framework', in Mertus and Helsing (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict, pp. 63-95.

Schmitt C. (1950) Der Nomos der Erde im Voelkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europeum [The Nomos of Earth in the Law of People of the European Public Law]. Koln, Greven. Italian translation Il Nomos della Terra. Milan: Adelphi, 1991.

Stewart F. (2004), Development and Security, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper 3, London: University of Oxford.

United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations, 26 July 1945. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 7 October 2008.
---- (1992) An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary General A/47/277 - S/24/11, 17 June 1992. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.
---- (1995) Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary General A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.
---- (1998) The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Secretary-General's Report to the United Nations Security Council, 16 April 1998. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 March 2004.
---- (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 27 October 2006.

---- (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 29 March 2008.

---- (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All, Report of the Secretary-General A/59/2005, 21 March 2005. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 13 January 2008.

---- (2009) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary General A/63/677, 12 January 2009. Available from [www.un.org], accessed on 17 March 2010.

United Nations Development Programme (1994) Human Development Report. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

United Nation Children's Fund, UNICEF, (2004) The State of the World's Children 2005. Childhood Under Threat. New York: UNICEF House.

Winslow D. J. (2004) 'Human Security', in Gobbicchi (ed.), Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security, Ch. 15.

Gianfabrizio Ladini was born in Trieste (Italy). He holds a BA in philosophy (political theory), MAs in European affairs and peace studies, plus various diplomas, courses and trainings in international cooperation and conflict resolution. He worked with projects and NGOs in the West Bank (Occupied Palestinian Territories), Cyprus and Kosovo and he is currently serving as project officer with the Italian Consortium of Solidarity in the field of refugee protection. Contact: g_ladini@yahoo.it.

ATTENTION! Woman Found Scrubbing the Floors

By **Colin J. Gardner**

As I read the Honolulu Advertiser at breakfast, an advertisement with large red bold-type font caught my eye: "Woman Found Scrubbing the Floors." What? Below the title was a young woman scrubbing the floor on her hands and knees. Next to her head were the words, "Husband said she was on her hands and knees for days…Don't let this happen to you. Buy an Oreck Orbiter today."

Was this really happening? I grasped the paper and peered closer as a half-eaten Portuguese sausage slid off my fork and plopped onto the table. I looked for signs that the ad was a joke. Was I reading The Onion by mistake? Perhaps it was a rehash and analysis of some ancient ad from the 60's? In disbelief, I began to show the ad to family members. They seemed mildly interested, as if to say, "yea, what's abnormal about that? Why are you getting so worked up?"

I like to think of myself as a feminist. I fantasize about the erosion of gender constructs and all that comes with it. "Men" and "women" live within preset roles and we should fight them, and live as we are deep down. This ad must be a joke, from another time. It wasn't.

I decided I'd let the ad wash over my consciousness and let it work its message, consciously. I started to pretend the woman was real. Her name was Jessica. Don't ask why, she just looked like a Jessica. I began to construct different stories and narratives around Jessica with what little information the ad offered. The narrative was elaborate and complex. She had different personality traits and habits.

And I noticed… the less information there was, the more I inferred and the more meaning I constructed. Perhaps this is the aim of all advertisements. They present a scenario and let you think you are injecting your own meaning into it, but instead you are being guided towards their desired conclusion.

And then it happened - I began to subconsciously make excuses for the ad. What if Jessica truly chose to live her life this way? Perhaps she feels comfortable staying home and keeping the house clean? What if she feels liberated doing household duties? Who am I to judge what makes her happy?

I was making myself sick.

The most recent women's movement intended to incorporate women into the upper ranks of the business world. It was supposed to liberate them from "needing a man" for sustenance, happiness.

Yes, women have greater access to what they didn't before. They can earn salaries that enable them to be self-sufficient (albeit salaries remain unequal). They have access to far more jobs, opportunities, etc. But in the end they have only entered another oppressive sector of modernity, industry. Women are now subjected to alienating labor in the home and at work. Of course, not all labor inside the home and without is alienating by default, but the general reality is crystal clear.

As I looked deeper, I saw that even the woman in the ad was made a subject. All persons in advertisements are subjects. "Woman Found Scrubbing the Floors." She is just a woman, they seem to say. The husband, the only one with agency, finds his wife scrubbing the floors "on her hands and knees for days." However, the ad reminds us, "Don't let this happen to you." The remedy for the woman being subjected to this labor is not liberation, or for her "husband" to get on his hands and knees and help, but to buy a product from Oreck. The gateway to women's liberation is for her husband to purchase goods for her, and then for her to consume such goods. She is obviously too dumb to realize she needs an Oreck Orbiter.

The key to liberation, according to this ad, is to buy more stuff. And men, you need to tell your woman what this stuff is, as she would just as readily mindlessly work on her hands and knees as opposed to thinking critically about her situation. The circularity of the argument is shocking. The life of the American "wife" is to labor at home, then sell their labor power on the market, use that money to more efficiently labor in the home (the Oreck Orbiter), then buy more stuff (perhaps a bigger house or have more kids), which will add to the amount of stuff that must be cleaned and maintained.

On the surface it appears that women in this country (or any other industrialized nation) are more liberated than any other. We immediately, and ignorantly, lecture on the world of atrocities against Muslim women who are "forced" to wear hijab. The U.S. apparently sets the standard for the liberation of women in this world. Heck, in the last election we had two women vying for executive positions. Doesn't that mean we are doing well? Actually, if we think about how well we are dealing with racism during the tenure of our first "black" President, the actual "liberation" of women doesn't seem to stand much hope.

Look, there is no doubt that the lifestyles of women have drastically changed. But we must ask ourselves, how have they changed? To be fair, there are overt changes that are constructive. But there are also subliminal and more subversive forces that have filled the void. We must ask ourselves, are these new forces even more toxic? Shall we all take a stand, "get off our hands and knees," and liberate ourselves from the overt and subliminal chains we are subjected to?

Colin J. Gardner *is part of Unrest's Editorial Cell and a Masters student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution. Contact: cgardner@unrestmag.com cgardner@unrestmag.com*

The Unrest Magazine Editorial Cell

Michael D. English is an artist and agitator. He is also a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. Michael's desire to understand violence came through his experiences growing up in Cincinnati, Ohio and became his life's passion after watching Cincinnati descend into chaos in the wake of a police shooting in 2001. His research has taken him to Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and across the United States to investigate the phenomena of conflict, nationalism, and rebuilding communities after violence. In 2007, he completed his MS in Conflict Resolution from Portland State University in Portland, Oregon. Michael currently dwells in Arlington, Virginia and works in the university library. mdenglish@unrestmag.com

Jay Filipi is a Masters student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He is interested in the interplay of popular culture and conflict: the philosophical conceptions of justice as they manifest in mainstream American culture; ideology and trauma; and music and conflict resolution. His Masters thesis was on Music and Conflict and investigated if music was effective in conflict resolution as well as what conditions were necessary. In the summer of 2008, he went to Russia and China. In China he met with members of the Chinese government as well as NGOs and independent think tanks. January of 2009, Jay spent time in Israel-Palestine meeting with a wide range of citizens, students, journalists, governmental officials, and activists. Jay received a B.S. in Secondary Education and minors in Women's Studies and Religion from the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Jay has worked as an educator, photographer and community organizer. He has helped to coordinate and organize workshops and seminars on Peace and Justice for hundreds of people in his home city of Omaha. jfilipi@unrestmag.com

Colin J. Gardner is a Master's student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He became interested in Conflict Analysis during a mediation training with the Intergroup Relations Center at Arizona State University. He earned his B.S. in Justice Studies and Social Inquiry, and began his graduate academic career with coursework at Arizona State in environmental social science. Colin claims to have discovered the solution for all conflict, but forgot to write it down - he continues to search his memory for the answer. cgardner@unrestmag.com

Jason D. Reader is a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. Jason obtained his M.S. from ICAR in 2009. He is a former Officer with the Virginia Department of Corrections. jreader@unrestmag.com

Sarah Rose-Jensen is a Masters student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. She has been an anti-war organizer in the DC area for several years, and has worked as a teacher and on the staff of a non-profit focusing on women's job training and employment issues. In the summers she works at a peace-building summer camp, which focuses on youth from conflict and post-conflict regions. srose-jensen@unrestmag.com

Richard E. Rubenstein is University Professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs at George Mason University and is a former director of ICAR. He teaches courses on theories of conflict, conflict and religion, conflict and empire, and conflict and literature, and writes books on these topics based on historical analysis and storytelling. His practical work involves attempts (with ICAR colleagues and others) to introduce policymakers and media workers to new social and ethical paradigms that point in the direction of radical reform of violence-generating ideas and institutions. Rubenstein lives in Washington, DC with his life-partner, Susan Ryerson. He has four children and two grandchildren. He plays a middling brand of jazz piano. rrubenstein@unrestmag.com

Derek Sweetman is a PhD student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University and a Graduate Lecturer for New Century College, also at George Mason. He is the Dispute Resolution Director for the Better Business Bureau in Washington, DC, serves as an arbitrator and mediator for local community organizations, and was the editor and publisher of *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution* from 1998 until 2006. He received a M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from ICAR in 2006 and in 2009 published *Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Contributions from the Private Sector to Address Violent Conflict.* He currently lives in Centreville, VA with his wife and daughter. dsweetman@unrestmag.com

submit to unrest

unrest magazine is a web-based publication dedicated
to advancing critical conflict theory & engagement.
those interested in collaborating with
unrest should go to www.unrestmag.com
or email unrestmag@gmail.com
for more details.